Quick takes // By Ben FrankelBringing matters to a head in Syria

Published 24 November 2015

The growing tensions among the major players in Syria is reflection of the different strategic interests of these plays. Iran and Russia would cooperate with the United States in fighting ISIS — but only as part of a strategy to keep the Alawite Assad in power and prevent the Sunni majority from coming to power in Syria. The leading Sunni states have given mostly lip-service to the need to fight ISIS, because Sunnis are not going seriously to fight the fellow Sunnis of ISIS, despicable as they are, unless that campaign is part of a broader strategy to remove Assad and the Alawites from power in Syria, reduce Iran’s influence in Syria and Lebanon, turn Syria into a country run by its Sunni majority, and protect the interests of Iraq’s Sunnis. ISIS is the result — the ugly, deadly result — of growing Sunni grievances since the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. ISIS can be defeated militarily, and it will be defeated, but unless Sunni grievances — in Iraq, in Syria, in Palestine — are effectively addressed, the removal of ISIS from the stage would merely be a prelude to the emrengence of the next ISIS-like group.

The downing of the Russian jet over Turkey, and two similar incidents in October, are a reminder of the growing risks in the increasingly crowded skies over Syria, where planes from the United States, the U.S.-led coalition, Russia, the Syrian air force, France, and, soon, the United Kingdom pursue different missions without a great deal of coordination.

  • The U.S. and its allies concentrate on bombing ISIS targets.
  • Russia and the Syrian air force almost exclusively attack Syrian rebel groups – some of which are supported by the United States, Turkey, and Jordan – in order to keep the Assad regime in power.
  • Turkey attacks the Kurdish rebels who fight ISIS, because the same rebels are also supporting a measure of autonomy for the Kurds in Turkey.

Both Russia and Turkey engage in token attacks on ISIS forces so they can say they are in Syria to fight ISIS, but their interests are significantly different from the interests of the United States and its allies:

  • Russia and Iran want to save the Assad regime, which Iran sees as a linchpin in its effort to gain a regional hegemony by creating a Shi’a crescent which runs from Tehran through Baghdad to Damascus to the Hezbollah-controlled areas in east and South Lebanon. In the south, Iran supports the Shi’a Huthis in Yemen. Russia, Iran, and Assad see the Syrian rebels, not ISIS, as the main threat to the Assad regime, so they turn their fire on those rebels, hoping that if the only two forces left in the Syrian theater are Assad and ISIS, the West would support Assad, even if grudgingly.
  • Turkey supports several Syrian rebel groups, but sees ISIS as a potent, if exceedingly disagreeable, Sunni force capable of fighting both the Syrian Kurds and the Assad regime.
  • The Obama administration announced early on that “Assad must go,” but has done little to advance this goal. The administration’s efforts to help create a vetted, moderate Syrian force to fight ISIS have failed, and its current efforts to work with existing – vetted or not – rebel groups has so far failed as well (with the exception of the Kurds) because few, if any, Sunnis would fight the fellow Sunnis of ISIS, despicable as they are, on behalf of the Shia’s in Iran and Hezbollah, or the Alawites in Damascus.

The heart of the problem, then, is this:

  • Iran and Russia would cooperate with the United States in fighting ISIS — but only as part of a strategy to keep the Alawite Assad in power and prevent the Sunni majority from coming to power in Syria.
  • The leading Sunni states — Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey — have given mostly lip-service to the need to fight ISIS, and have engaged in a few symbolic military and other actions against the Islamist group, but the Sunni countries are not going seriously to fight ISIS unless that campaign is part of a broader strategy to remove Assad and the Alawites from power, reduce Iran’s influence in Syria and Lebanon, turn Syria into a country run by its Sunni majority, and protect the interests of Iraq’s Sunnis.

ISIS is the result — the ugly, deadly result — of growing Sunni grievances since the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. The only strategy which would defeat ISIS and reduce its appeal would be a strategy which would include, in addition to the military component, also an effort to address and resolve these Sunni grievances. Supporting, or appearing to support, Iran’s regional hegemonic ambitions, and supporting, or appearing to support, Iran’s Shi’a and Alawite allies, are precisely the opposite of a strategy aiming to reduce the sense of Sunni grievance. Any policy which supports, or appears to support, Iran and its regional allies — Assad, Hezbollah, Yemen’s Huthis — is only going to excerbate Sunni grievances, leading to the strenghtening of ISIS and its appeal to Sunnis.

ISIS can be defeated militarily, and it will be defeated, but unless Sunni grievances — in Iraq, in Syria, in Palestine — are effectively addressed, the removal of ISIS from the stage would merely be a prelude to the emrengence of the next ISIS-like group.

Ben Frankel is the editor of the Homeland Security News Wire