SurveillanceAfter Paris, it’s traditional detective work that will keep us safe, not mass surveillance

By Pete Fussey

Published 25 November 2015

Before the dust has even settled from the attacks on Paris, familiar calls for greater surveillance powers are surfacing. The desire for greater security is understandable, but that doesn’t mean we should suspend our judgement on the measures proposed to bring it about. It’s widely accepted that intelligence work is the most effective form of counter-terrorism, and that the best intelligence comes from community engagement, not coercion. So we must be wary of the evangelism of those pushing technological solutions to security problems, and the political clamor for mass surveillance.

Before the dust has even settled from the attacks on Paris, familiar calls for greater surveillance powers are surfacing. The desire for greater security is understandable, but that doesn’t mean we should suspend our judgement on the measures proposed to bring it about.

In the aftermath of the attack, Prime Minister David Cameron intimated a desire to accelerate the passage of the Investigatory Powers bill through parliament, while in the United States, CIA chief John Brennan called for greater powers for the intelligence and security services. Such sentiments reflect a longstanding attitude championing the benefits of technological solutions.

The rush to legislate and grant sweeping powers has led to untried and untested provisions and incoherent laws that complicate security practice. Following the Charlie Hebdo attacks in January 2015, the French government enacted new surveillance laws that introduced warrantless searches, the requirement for ISPs to collect communications metadata, and watered-down oversight regimes. In the United Kingdom, the response to the September 11 attacks included rushing through powers in the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001, but it’s the more considered Terrorism Act 2000 and other laws already on the books that have proved more useful when it comes to convicting terrorists.

Politicians make claims about the number of threats and plots averted by the secret services’ use of surveillance data. But this rhetoric is rarely backed up with facts, and masks the practical and ethical problems that strong powers of mass surveillance bring.

A technocratic mirage
Those supporting mass surveillance of digital communications data have to conclusively demonstrate its usefulness. The history of technocratic approaches to security is littered with claims of effectiveness that are overstated, unproven or just wrong. Such claims must be treated with skepticism, not least because money spent here will divert scarce resources away from traditional intelligence and policing techniques that are tried and tested.

As a journalist and confident of Edward Snowden, Glenn Greenwald said: “Every terrorist who’s capable of tying their own shoes has long known that the U.S. and U.K. government are trying to monitor their communications in every way that they can.” Academic research has consistently shown terrorists are innovative in their use of technology in order to evade detection. A Flashpoint intelligence report in 2014 revealed that there had been no expansion of terrorists’ use of encryption technology following Snowden’s revelations, largely because those that could were already using it.