Arab public opinion overwhelmingly opposes ISIS

Survey results show that no consensus exists among the Arab people over the best measures by which to combat ISIS, and armed terrorist groups in general. The Center says that this reflects both the complexity of the issue and the sophisticated attitudes of the Arab public toward it. Respondents cited different measures as the most important in combatting ISIS and ending the threat of terrorism, including: supporting democratic transition in the region (28 percent); resolving the Palestinian cause (18 percent); ending foreign intervention (14 percent); intensifying the military campaign against ISIS (14 percent); and solving the Syrian crisis in line with the aspirations of the Syrian people (12 percent).

In line with previous polls within the Arab Opinion Index, this year’s results show that a majority (62 percent) of the Arab public views a change in the Syrian regime as the best means by which to end the Syrian crisis. In other words, and comparing these findings to previous opinion polls, the Arab public at large remains sympathetic to the aims and objectives of the Syrian rebellion.

In parallel to the Syrian crisis, attention in the Arab world has also been sharply focused on negotiations covering Iran’s nuclear program, and Iran’s ability to arrive at an agreement with a group of important world powers (the permanent five members of the UN Security Council in addition to Germany).

Since 2011, there has been increased desire among the Arab public for the Middle East to be declared a nuclear weapons-free zone, yet many respondents agreed that Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons justified attempts by other regional powers to acquire such weapons. The Iranian nuclear program has a stated aim which is limited to the production of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but the rising opposition to nuclear weapons in the Middle East is related to the negotiations which preceded the Iranian nuclear agreement, and Iran’s involvement in the affairs of Arab countries in the region has also heightened this interest. In fact, more Arabs believe that Israel will benefit from the Iranian nuclear agreement than believe that the Arab states stand to gain by the rapprochement between Tehran and the West.

Results show a divided Arab public opinion regarding the Iranian nuclear deal: 40 percent of the respondents support it and 32 percent oppose it. Their opinions are largely based on their assessment of Iranian policies in the region. Thirty-one percent of the respondents formed their supporting or opposing opinion regarding the nuclear deal based on their opposition to Iran’s interference in the affairs of some Arab states, in a manner that has threatened the national security of those states. However, 16 percent of the respondents opposed the Iranian nuclear deal based on their view that the deal represents a submission on Iran’s part to the United States and hence benefits Israel.  

The results of the Arab Opinion Index showed that 34 percent of the public views the Arab revolutions and the Arab Spring as positive developments, while 59 percent expressed a negative view. Those whose views of the Arab revolutions’ developments were negative explained their positions in reference to the large-scale human losses; the spread of discord and chaos and lack of security; the collapse of states and state institutions; and instability more broadly. Only 5 percent of those who have negative views of the Arab revolutions based their opinion on general opposition to revolutions. The results are, in fact, an assessment of the developments that followed the Arab Spring revolutions of 2011.

The Center notes that Arab citizens are still optimistic regarding the future of Arab revolutions which started in 2011: 48 percent of respondents believe the Arab Spring is facing a series of challenges and obstacles, but will ultimately succeed in achieving its aims. However, 34 percent believe the Arab Spring has ended and the old regimes have returned to power. The main stated reasons for the obstruction of the Arab Spring: security deterioration in some states, economic hardship, foreign intervention, appearance of extremist organizations, incitement by previous regimes, and incitement by media outlets. The continuation of the state of chaos in some Arab countries as well as increased regime totalitarianism will lead to a reduction in optimism regarding the future of Arab revolutions.

Citizens in the Arab region have expressed their fears, to varying degrees, with regards to the rise of both Islamist and non-Islamic secular political movements. Fifty-seven percent of respondents expressed their fears toward Islamist political movements compared with 36 percent who said they have no fears. For secular political movements, 61 percent of respondents said they have fears towards them compared with 31 percent who said they have no fears.

Dr. Mohammad Almasri, coordinator of the Arab Opinion Index who has supervised this survey, pointed out that, “The fact that large groups of Arab respondents fear the rise and ascendancy of both Islamist and non-Islamist/secular political movements is a reflection of the discord and disarray among Arab political movements and the partisanship and conflicts between Arab political movements.” This has created a lack of public confidence in Arab political movements.

He added, “Respondents who have expressed their fears of both or one side have stated clear and specific reasons for that. Given these public attitudes, the lack of consensus between these two broad categories of political movements, and their inability to reduce public fear towards them, can be exploited by anti-democratic forces to agitate for a return to authoritarianism, and will therefore prove to be an obstacle on the path to democratization.”

The countries included within this year’s Arab Opinion Index are Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania, Egypt, Sudan, Palestine, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. Together, they represent 90 percent of the population of the Arab League. Each of the country-specific samples were conducted using a randomized, self-weighted, multi-stage cluster method, providing margins of error of between 2 percent and 3 percent.

— Read more in 2015 Arab Opinion Index (Doha Institute, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, December 2015)