Iran dealIran nuclear deal: how to ensure compliance?
The U.S. and European countries lifted nuclear-related sanctions against Iran on 16 January as part of a deal in which the country agreed to limit its nuclear activities and accept a new system of international inspections. The issue now is how the international community can be confident that Iran is not violating the deal. Iran agreed never to develop nuclear weapons when it signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968. There’s no ironclad method to prevent Iran from breaking its promise and developing nuclear weapons, but this new agreement builds in a number of strong protections. In conjunction with U.S. and allied intelligence capabilities, these rules mean even a sophisticated and carefully executed secret plan would carry a high risk of detection.Looking at the deal as a whole, Iran’s best strategy for acquiring nuclear weapons would simply be to wait for restrictions on its declared enrichment program to be lifted. Assuming that the deal does not fall apart sooner, most of those provisions are scheduled to expire in 2030. In the meantime, the deal helps make a nuclear-armed Iran a less immediate prospect.
The U.S. and European countries lifted nuclear-related sanctions against Iran on 16 January as part of a deal in which the country agreed to limit its nuclear activities and accept a new system of international inspections. This week Iranian President Hassan Rouhani is in France, seeking to rekindle long-dormant Western business connections.
The issue now is how the international community can be confident that Iran is not violating the deal, formally referred to as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. A helpful approach is to ask two questions:
- Could Iran collect the nuclear material needed to build a weapon?
- Could the international community discover those efforts before it was too late?
Iran agreed never to develop nuclear weapons when it signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968. There’s no ironclad method to prevent Iran from breaking its promise and developing nuclear weapons, but this new agreement builds in a number of strong protections. In conjunction with U.S. and allied intelligence capabilities, these rules mean even a sophisticated and carefully executed secret plan would carry a high risk of detection.
Three steps of development
There are three major tasks involved in building a nuclear weapon: acquiring the nuclear fuel, constructing the other components of a nuclear bomb or warhead and developing a delivery system.
Given Iran’s history with ballistic missiles, it is best to assume that Iran would have relatively little difficulty developing a suitable delivery system.
A December 2015 report from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) explored the so-called “possible military dimensions” of Iran’s nuclear program, but Iran’s research and development activities in the field of weaponization remain uncertain. Some of these activities, such as performing computer simulations for weapons design, are fairly easy to hide. Others, like developing high-speed electronic switches, have applications in both nuclear weapons and nonnuclear industries, meaning Iran could conceal military intentions under cover of peaceful work. It is best to assume that Iran would be able to quickly assemble a bomb in a hidden location if it ever acquired enough weapons-usable nuclear fuel.
Consequently, the focus of international effort should be on blocking Iran’s access to nuclear material, and rapidly detecting any clandestine attempts to acquire it.
