European securityBrexit: Europe’s new nationalism is here to stay
The British referendum that has delivered a vote for “Brexit” is the latest, dramatic indication that the atavistic nationalistic impulses of the twentieth century – impulses which the construction of the EU was supposed to lay to rest — are here to stay. This nationalism has brewed largely in reaction to how the EU has evolved over the past few decades. What started as a common market grew to embrace a single currency, the Schengen area, and integration in justice and home affairs. What we have witnessed with the rise of Euroscepticism is the recrudescence of a robust form of populist nationalism. It is sincerely anti-intellectual, offers facile solutions to complex problems, prefers what it calls “plain-speaking” over a well-articulated elocution, and is utterly unapologetic in its disdain for the establishment. Unless the EU can infuse its institutions with greater democratic legitimacy — voters need to be able to identify with the people who make decisions on their behalf — this populist nationalism will persist for the foreseeable future. The United Kingdom may be the first country to leave the EU but it may not be the last. Europe’s new nationalism is here to stay.
It is something of a tragic irony that the European Union – originally constructed to lay to rest the atavistic nationalist impulses of the twentieth century – is today behind the resurgence of such feelings across much of Europe. The British referendum that has delivered a vote for “Brexit” is the latest, dramatic indication that this nationalism is here to stay.
This nationalism has brewed largely in reaction to how the EU has evolved over the past few decades. What started as a common market grew to embrace a single currency, the Schengen area, and integration in justice and home affairs. All this has diluted core aspects of national sovereignty: states have less control over macro-economic policy, borders and people.
The EU also enlarged to embrace Central and Eastern Europe. The inclusion of twelve new member-states with distinct histories, economic structures, and democratic traditions has rendered the decision-making process at the EU level all the more cumbersome. At the same time, it has made EU policy all the less responsive to public opinion. These transformations have been very disquieting for voters in certain countries – like the United Kingdom.
But what we have witnessed in the United Kingdom is part of a much broader shift in public attitudes towards the EU from what analysts have called a “permissive consensus” to a “constraining dissensus.” In the past, European leaders quietly pursued integration in such areas as agriculture and the public paid little attention. More recently though, leaders have sought to take collective decisions in areas such as trade in services, banking, or asylum. But they have to bear in mind that the voters back home are more likely to pay more attention and to be skeptical.
Nationalists of all stripes
This skepticism draws strength from the perception that the EU is responsible for the sundry ills that underlie the malaise felt by many European voters. Economic dislocation and industrial restructuring, austerity and privatization, unemployment and job insecurity, fear of immigration, and a more general sense of vanishing influence over the decisions that affect their daily lives. All feed into the negative feelings people have about the EU.