IntelligenceCENTCOM’s assessment of U.S. anti-ISIS efforts too rosy: Congressional panel

A congressional joint task force (JTF) investigating allegations of intelligence manipulation at U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) last week released an initial report detailing persistent problems in 2014 and 2015 with CENTCOM analysis of U.S. efforts to train the Iraqi Security Forces and combat ISIS in Iraq and Syria.

The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence says that the JTF found that intelligence products approved by senior CENTCOM leaders typically provided a more positive depiction of U.S. antiterrorism efforts than was warranted by facts on the ground and were consistently more positive than analysis produced by other elements of the intelligence community. It further determined that numerous process changes implemented at CENCTOM as well as leadership deficiencies resulted in widespread dissatisfaction among CENTCOM analysts who felt their superiors were distorting their products.

The report found that,

The leadership environment within CENTCOM and its Intelligence Directorate deteriorated significantly following the 2013 departure of Marine Gen. James Mattis and his senior intelligence leaders. Survey results provided to the Joint Task Force demonstrated that dozens of analysts viewed the subsequent leadership environment as toxic, with 40 percent of analysts responding that they had experienced an attempt to distort or suppress intelligence in the past year. While the Joint Task Force heard testimony that the environment slowly began to improve following the initiation of the DODIG investigation in mid-2015, many issues persisted until the arrival of Army Gen. Joseph Votel and the new head of CENTCOM’s Intelligence Directorate.

The report notes that,

Some analysts were unable to ascribe motives to the changes, but agreed that the rationale for them was not clearly understood in the JIC [Joint Intelligence Center]. Some analysts, including the whistleblower, stated that the effect of these changes was to slow the review process or to alter the analysis such that the final products no longer reflected the views or analytic judgment of senior, career intelligence analysts. For instance, senior leaders could now more directly modify key analytic judgements made by career analysts.”

The report adds that

analysts indicated that CENTOM Intelligence Directorate leadership consistently “softened” intelligence assessments to provide more uncertainty regarding possible outcomes. Analysts described the leadership as risk-averse and unwilling to accept uncertainty in intelligence analysis — which by its very nature deals in probabilities and contingencies rather than certainties. Survey results also indicated that multiple analysts felt that assessments were frequently edited to more positively reflect the situation on the ground.

Created in response to a whistleblower allegation, the JTF was established by the chairmen of the House Armed Services Committee, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the House Appropriations Committee. It is led by Representatives Ken Calvert, Mike Pompeo, and Brad Wenstrup.

Rep. Calvert said, “The leadership failures at CENTCOM reach to the very top of the organization. I hope that the new CENTCOM commander and the new Director of Intelligence can turn things around quickly. As for the task force, it is critical that we follow up on the deficiencies highlighted in this initial report. What happened at CENTCOM is unacceptable – our warfighters suffer when bad analysis is presented to senior policymakers. We must continue our efforts until we fix it.”

Rep. Wenstrup said, “I am proud to serve on the Joint Task Force, which is working diligently to conduct a thorough investigation into the CENTCOM intelligence directorate. Amongst other findings, our investigation has determined that unfavorable intelligence reports underwent significant scrutiny and were likely to be omitted unless they could be confirmed with virtually 100 percent certainty. As a Lieutenant Colonel in the Army Reserve, I understand that intelligence is not always certain. Possibilities and probabilities can be just as critical for decision makers. Additionally, despite nearly nine months of review, we still do not fully understand the reasons and motivations behind this practice and how often the excluded analyses were proven ultimately to be correct. We cannot win the war against ISIS with incomplete intelligence. The report out today highlights the importance of having an independent process.”

The JTF investigation remains ongoing and is occurring alongside a separate investigation by the Department of Defense Inspector General. 

— Read more in Initial Findings of the U.S. House of Representatives Joint Task Force on U.S. Central Command Intelligence Analysis (10 August 2016)