Effective counter-extremism policy in the U.S. would focus on individuals, not entire communities

The first concerns the lack of empirical knowledge about the root causes and drivers of violent extremism. This lacuna has led to conceptual confusion about CVE. It is difficult to design an effective policy when there is little consensus on what it means or what it constitutes. Consequently, CVE policy and efforts are mostly designed and funded on the basis of anecdotal evidence, with unknown results.

Secondly, the Obama administration’s domestic CVE policy has strained relations with an entire religious community, in large part because its policy perceives American Muslims through a security lens. The Department of Justice has led domestic CVE efforts, which primarily consist of outreach to Muslim leaders to keep the community onside and encourage information sharing about vulnerable youth. But the community rarely knows about youth who are radicalized in their midst. Moreover, the vast majority of Muslims do not embrace violent extremism, especially in America. Of the world’s jihadi foreign fighter population, there have been approximately 250 people mobilized out of 3.3 million Muslims in America (a mere .000075 percent) compared with 1,700 out of 4.7 million Muslims in France (.00036 percent), and 6,000 out of 11 million in Tunisia (.00054 percent). What is more, the scale, scope, and complexity of the problem varies significantly by location. For example, two neighborhoods in Brussels have produced nearly two-and-a-half times as many foreign fighters than all of America, despite the fact that America has more than five times as many Muslims.

McKenzie stresses that this is not to suggest that there is no threat from Salafi violent extremism in United States, rather that it is neither the only nor by far the greatest threat to the country and its interests. It should go without saying that alienating an entire religious community undermines American principles and values. Worse yet, this alienation could very well spur radicalization, thereby not only undermining our principles and values, but also our security. Therefore, it is not inconceivable that an alienating CVE agenda could in fact create the very problem it sets out to solve.

In the report, McKenzie offers specific policy recommendations, then concludes:

What is needed is to clearly define the concept and practice — as well as tighten the scope of effort — while always adhering to American values and principles.

For these reasons, the U.S. government should jettison a community-oriented approach. A better agenda would focus on individuals who have demonstrated a clear and sustained interest in jihadist propaganda, not an entire faith-based community. The more that the CVE agenda can identify and target specific individuals who have demonstrated sympathy for designated foreign terrorist organizations, the more the U.S. government will be able to measure and evaluate success, refine its programs and initiatives accordingly, and ultimately mitigate the threat of violent extremism in America.

— Read more in Robert L. McKenzie, Countering violent extremism in America: Policy recommendations for the next president (Brookings Institution, 18 October 2016)