North Korea: SanctionsWhy didn’t sanctions stop North Korea’s missile program?

By Daniel Salisbury

Published 6 September 2017

North Korea’s long-range missile program has made significant technological advances in the past few months. For most of the past twenty years, the international community has struggled to stop this kind of progress by imposing a series of severe sanctions on the country. Have sanctions failed? This question is complicated, but what is undeniable is that sanctions have had unforeseen consequences by making North Korea’s procurement efforts more sophisticated as Chinese middlemen monetize the risk. Americans tend to view North Korea as an inward-looking, economically isolated state cut off from the international community. However, the country’s illicit networks – including those supplying its missile program – are global and responsive. Ultimately, they will be difficult to counter.

North Korea’s long-range missile program has made significant technological advances in the past few months.

For most of the past twenty years, the international community has struggled to stop this kind of progress.

Kim Jong Un’s plan to target four test missiles approximately twenty miles off the coast of the U.S. territory of Guam shows just how destabilizing this rapidly advancing ballistic missile program can be. North Korea’s plan – which Kim claims will be finalized later this month – follows last month’s two successful tests of an intercontinental ballistic missile with the capability to hit the United States.

My research on how states illegally obtain missile technologies and my experience conducting outreach related to UN sanctions give me some insight into the methods North Korea used to make illicit procurements and the limitations in using technology-based sanctions to prevent them.

Technology-based sanctions
In 2006 – following North Korea’s first nuclear test – the UN Security Council prohibited the “supply, sale or transfer” of “items, materials, equipment, goods and technology” that could contribute to the country’s missile program.

Efforts to prevent North Korea’s acquisition of missile technology by certain nations – notably the United States – had been underway since the 1990s. However, the UN sanctions went further by placing standardized legal requirements on all states to prevent the development of North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction programs.

These sanctions are “universal” – obligatory for all states around the world. Each nation is responsible for implementation within its borders. Missile, nuclear and military technologies are regulated through national export control systems. Exports of certain goods and technologies need to be granted an export license by the government. This allows governments to do a risk assessment on transactions and minimize the diversions to undesirable uses, such as Weapons of Mass Destruction programs or human rights abuses.

In theory, all countries should have the capacity to implement technology-based sanctions. Having an export control system has been mandatory for states since the passage of UN Security Council resolution 1540 in 2004. However, more than a decade after this resolution was passed, many nations – particularly developing ones – are still struggling with implementation.

This has led to uneven execution of missile-related sanctions on North Korea. A recent report has described the UN sanctions regime as a “house without foundations,” noting that not a single element of the sanctions regime “enjoys robust international implementation.”