Israeli rocket experience shows bomb shelters matter as much as interceptors
The country simultaneously invested another US$140 million in rocket warning systems. Loud speakers and cellphone apps give increasingly precise alerts.
Israel was divided into only 25 warning zones in 2006. That grew to 127 in 2012 and 200 in 2014. The count hit 248 in 2015, and may soon reach 3,000 zones.
Even interceptor advocates agree civil defenses save lives and prevent injuries. An analysis of the 2006 Second Lebanon War between Israel and Hezbollah noted that most rocket deaths involved people out in the open. Rocket fatality rates declined once warning systems were fine-tuned and residents learned to take shelter.
The benefits of civil defenses have also been observed for rocket fire from Gaza. For example, they helped reduce casualties during Israel’s Operation Cast Lead against Hamas militants there in 2008-2009. Some 617 rockets landed in Israel during the conflict.
One study estimated that southern Israel’s defenses reduced rocket casualties by at least a factor of three from 2000 to 2010. For example, suppose residents had not received warnings and taken shelter during Cast Lead. There could have been more than 423 rocket injuries instead of 141.
Interceptors or shelters?
My own research indicates that losses on a per-rocket basis continued to drop after Cast Lead. That was despite rising rocket sizes and ranges.
Interceptor advocates credit Iron Dome for those decreases. But the data suggest civil defense enhancements were at least as effective as the interceptor deployments.
How much can be attributed to civil defense improvements? Consider Operation Pillar of Defense. During eight days in 2012, Israeli airstrikes pounded Gaza while Hamas militants fired 1,506 rockets at Israel.
According to my calculations, death and injury rates per rocket in that conflict fell 36 per cent relative to Cast Lead. The improvements therefore prevented roughly three extra deaths and 135 extra injuries. That’s on top of the pre-existing protection provided by Cast Lead-era shelters.
The benefits were bigger during Operation Protective Edge in 2014, which involved more than 3,000 rockets. My study suggests civil defense enhancements cut fatalities 71 per cent and casualties 75 per cent compared to Cast Lead. That avoided about five deaths and 250 injuries, again on top of the benefits from previously built defenses.
Other advantages
Civil defenses also offer advantages over interceptors. One is price. Iron Dome ammunition reportedly costs over $100,000 per shot. Other interceptors are even pricier. By contrast, shelters and warning systems involve minimal usage costs.
Civil defenses also tolerate large salvos almost as well as individual rockets. By contrast, too many rockets arriving at once could overwhelm an Iron Dome battery.
That risk hasn’t mattered against Hamas’ relatively small salvos. But it could be a problem against Hezbollah forces potentially firing 1,000 rockets daily, or against attackers using decoys to distract interceptors. (Machine gun bullets apparently will do the trick.)
Of course, interceptors offer advantages too. Successful interceptions protect people and property. Shelters, on the other hand, only protect people, and only if they’re inside.
The best approach combines interceptors and civil defenses in mutual support. Unfortunately, even that can’t completely prevent missile deaths and injuries. It also doesn’t prevent their disruptions to daily life and economic activity — all factors that leaders in Israel and elsewhere should consider carefully as they navigate these tense times.
Michael J. Armstrong is Associate professor of operations research, Goodman School of Business, Brock University. This article is published courtesy of The Conversation
