African securityU.S.-provided security sector assistance in Africa largely failed
The United States has sought to combat security threats in Africa – whether terrorism or, in a previous era, communism – principally by providing security sector assistance (SSA) to partner governments on the continent. Two new studies suggest that U.S.-provided SSA in Africa has largely failed to achieve its goals.
Two new RAND Corporation reports suggest that U.S.-provided security sector assistance (SSA) in Africa has largely failed to achieve its goals.
The United States has sought to combat security threats in Africa – whether terrorism or, in a previous era, communism – principally by providing SSA to partner governments on the continent. Proponents of such assistance claim that it is a cost-effective tool for advancing U.S. interests on the continent while being welcomed by the African partners.
Critics, on the other hand, contend that SSA has been at best ineffective, leading to brief but unsustainable improvements in security, or at worst detrimental in undercutting precisely the goals the United States has tried to achieve by inflaming inter-communal tensions, undermining civil-military relations or contributing to human rights abuses.
The RAND researchers find that for most of the past quarter-century, SSA has been highly inefficient, achieving no aggregate reduction in insurgencies or terrorism in the countries in which it has been spent. During the Cold War, it appears to have even been counterproductive, increasing the incidence of conflict in recipient countries. But there is also evidence that, under the right conditions, SSA can reduce violence and human rights abuses.
The authors recommend options to improve the sustainability and effectiveness of SSA in the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) area of responsibility, and outline specific practices to enhance the sustainability of partner capacity gains.
Key findings
The United States deemphasized governance issues during Cold War competition
· During the Cold War, the United States’ primary goal was to maintain partnerships with governments in Africa and to prevent regimes from slipping into the Soviet orbit. Enhancing governance or human rights — or even maintaining peace and stability — was not the overriding goal of U.S. assistance in this period. SSA in this period went disproportionately to poorly governed states.
Security sector assistance in the Cold War appears to have increased the incidence of civil wars
· U.S. assistance appears likely to have increased the incidence of civil wars in this period, likely by either exacerbating domestic instabilities or provoking proxy conflicts.
Most security sector assistance in most countries in the post–Cold War era appears to have had little net impact
· Whatever “success stories” might exist are relatively modest in their impact on political violence, obscured by much larger amounts of inefficient spending or offset by counterproductive outcomes in other cases.
Security sector assistance has had significant, positive impact in peacekeeping contexts
· Even when they controlled for the direct effects of “blue helmets,” the authors found that SSA executed in the presence of UN peacekeepers has statistically significant, favorable effects on a range of outcomes. It decreases the likelihood of renewed conflict, terrorist attacks, and government repression.
Recommendations
· Balance goals of achieving access and influence with governance concerns.
· Adopt a comprehensive approach with persistent presence and oversight.
· Conduct risk assessments.
· Commit to rigorous monitoring and evaluation.
· Improve the quality of SSA data.
· Conduct in-depth evaluations of high-impact, high-risk programs.
