DeterrenceBolstering extended deterrence in a complex world

Published 23 November 2018

A variety of threats from Russia, China and North Korea makes it critical that U.S. policymakers take a fresh look at what constitutes an effective strategy to deter interstate aggression, a new RAND report finds. The authors argue that growing opportunism in aggression seems less common than desperation through paranoia about growing threats to security or status. Large-scale aggression tends to emerge as a last resort, they find.

Geopolitical threats pile up, and so does need for discussion of deterrence as theory and practical policy requirement, a new RAND study finds.

A variety of threats from Russia, China and North Korea makes it critical that U.S. policymakers take a fresh look at what constitutes an effective strategy to deter interstate aggression, according to a new report from the RAND Corporation.

The authors say that discussion of deterrence as a theory and practical policy requirement has lagged in U.S. military and strategy circles but is becoming more important. They outline sixteen factors that tend to determine whether extended deterrence policies succeed or fail, and include a quantitative analysis of thirty-nine cases of U.S-led deterrence since 1945.

The motivations of potential aggressors are complex, and these aggressors typically respond to many variables whose interaction is difficult to anticipate. The authors argue that growing opportunism in aggression seems less common than desperation through paranoia about growing threats to security or status. Large-scale aggression tends to emerge as a last resort, they find.

Clarity and consistency of deterrent messaging is essential, they write, while half-hearted commitments risk being misperceived. Likewise, leaving an adversary without a way out is not an effective way to sustain deterrence.

The study supports a specific view of the requirements of extended deterrence of interstate aggression. It suggests that the foundation for deterrence outcomes – the decisive variable – is provided by aggressor motivations. Weakly motivated aggressors are easy to deter; while intensely motivated ones may be impossible to deter.

For example, in the case of Russian aggression, the United States could work with senior Russia officials to discuss steps both nations could take to ease tensions. The United States could avoid deployment of the most provocative U.S. weapons systems in or near Eastern Europe. Russian and Baltic forces could both be reduced, and all parties could work on a successor to the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. The United States also could work to create a context hostile to aggression, such as engaging in efforts to strengthen the political foundations of the North Atlantic Treating Organization, the authors conclude.

— Read more in Michael J. Mazarr et al., What Deters and Why: Exploring Requirements for Effective Deterrence of Interstate Aggression (RAND, November 2018)