TerrorismIslamic State: the “caliphate” is off the map for now, but will evolve in dangerous ways

By Harout Akdedian

Published 10 April 2019

The so-called Islamic State (IS) recently lost its last remnant of territory in Syria, but observers were quick to remind the world that the war against the organization is far from over. IS is now expected to evolve, but with its defeat on the ground in Syria and Iraq, IS and its offshoots will have a more limited capacity for recruitment, indoctrination and growth.

The so-called Islamic State (IS) recently lost its last remnant of territory in Syria, but observers were quick to remind the world that the war against the organization is far from over. What then does this loss of territorial control actually mean for IS?

At its height, the self-proclaimed “caliphate” controlled an estimated 34,000 square miles across Syria and Iraq, so its defeat on the ground is clearly a severe blow for it. Nevertheless, IS is now expected to evolve. Its networks will disperse into virtual, online spaces and become largely invisible. It will focus on insurgency tactics and terror attacks with a wider reach.

In the face of this evolution, it may seem like maintaining IS in a contained geographic pocket would have been better than eradicating its primary territorial base altogether. With its defeat on the ground in Syria and Iraq, however, IS and its offshoots will have a more limited capacity for recruitment, indoctrination and growth.

The importance of territory
The success of rebel groups to survive protracted armed conflicts is dependent on their ability to maintain territorial control. They require it to extract resources and enlist local recruits.

Territorial control allows armed groups to force local populations into compliance and conformity with their ideological outlook. Since its inception, IS understood that its radical “Islamic” community does not locally exist. Instead, the organization set about creating it, reshaping communities under its control in its own image.

Comparative evidence from civil wars around the world demonstrates how territorial control does not depend on a local population’s ideological agreement with the forces in place. Instead, in his book The Logic of Violence in Civil War, Stathis Kalyvas argues that a combination of coercive measures and local administrative bodies allows a force to maintain order, stability and compliance.

For example, during the Liberian civil war in the early 1990s, NPFL (The National Patriotic Front of Liberia) rebels, led by Charles Taylor, used administrative bodies and courts in the territory they controlled to create an alternative order backed up by displays of brutality and violence. This led to an intricate system of patronage and loyalty that created new dependencies between local communities and the new regime.