Perspective: The Russia connectionRussian Disinformation Distorted Reality in Ukraine. Americans Should Take Note.

Published 12 August 2019

As the 2020 U.S. presidential election approaches, pundits in the United States are naturally looking back to 2016 in an effort to predict just what form Russian interference will take this time around—especially after former special counsel Robert Mueller’s testimony on Capitol Hill last month, during which he warned, “They’re doing it as we sit here.” To understand the threat, Americans would do well to look at previous Russian disinformation campaigns. To gain a fuller picture of just what Russian interference could look like in 2020, it is necessary to look back at the Kremlin’s hybrid war in Ukraine from 2014 to 2016.

As the 2020 U.S. presidential election approaches, pundits in the United States are naturally looking back to 2016 in an effort to predict just what form Russian interference will take this time around—especially after former special counsel Robert Mueller’s testimony on Capitol Hill last month, during which he warned, “They’re doing it as we sit here.” Sam Sokol writes in Foreign Policy that to understand the threat, Americans would do well to look at previous Russian disinformation campaigns. To gain a fuller picture of just what Russian interference could look like in 2020, it is necessary to look back at the Kremlin’s hybrid war in Ukraine from 2014 to 2016.

Following the 2014 Euromaidan revolution, which saw Ukraine’s pro-Russian president deposed and the former Soviet republic beginning to tilt toward the West, Russia initiated a concerted effort—consisting of outright military aggression, proxy war, and disinformation—to delegitimize the new government in Kiev.

Branding the post-revolutionary government a “fascist junta,” the Russians took every opportunity to portray it and the Ukrainian state as purveyors of xenophobia, racism, and, especially, anti-Semitism. While the Jewish issue wasn’t one of particular concern to most Russians or Ukrainians, by identifying his enemies as Jew haters, Russian President Vladimir Putin was able to portray Ukrainian leaders as German-style fascists. In the post-Soviet sphere, where the memory of World War II is still a potent political force, this was a savvy, if immoral, move.

“The Russians have already shown they are willing to try to widen U.S. social cleavages based around race and identity, and recent spikes in anti-Semitism could provide Putin’s propagandists with another societal rift that they can exploit through the use of disinformation,” Sokol writes. “After all, they did it in Ukraine.”