PerspectiveHow to Measure Cybersecurity

Published 27 August 2019

Many experts agree that there are no universally recognized, generally accepted metrics by which to measure and describe cybersecurity improvements, and that, as a result, decision-makers are left to make choices about cybersecurity implementation based on qualitative measures rather than quantitative ones. Robert Taylo argues that the “search for quantitative metrics and dismissal of qualitative metrics ignores the dynamic nature of the challenge of ensuring cybersecurity, as well as the critical role of processes and procedures. Cybersecurity is a matter not just of the equipment and tools in place but also of how the equipment and tools are used by people, and how the organization ensures that the equipment and tools and methods of use are kept up to date. Qualitative measures that are discernible and reproducible are and will continue to be essential in helping to guide sound investment and operational decisions.”

Paul Rosenzweig observed recently on Lawfare that there are “no universally recognized, generally accepted metrics by which to measure and describe cybersecurity improvements” and that, as a result, decision-makers “are left to make choices about cybersecurity implementation based on qualitative measures rather than quantitative ones.” Rosenzweig is working with the R Street Institute to build a consensus on useful metrics.

Robert S. Taylor writes in Lawfare that by raising the question of what tools those with the responsibility to make an organization’s cybersecurity investment decisions should use, Rosenzweig has already made a significant contribution. “But his search for quantitative metrics and dismissal of qualitative metrics ignores the dynamic nature of the challenge of ensuring cybersecurity, as well as the critical role of processes and procedures. Cybersecurity is a matter not just of the equipment and tools in place but also of how the equipment and tools are used by people, and how the organization ensures that the equipment and tools and methods of use are kept up to date. Qualitative measures that are discernible and reproducible are and will continue to be essential in helping to guide sound investment and operational decisions,” Taylor writes.

There appears to be a huge societal underinvestment in cybersecurity. If the report of the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) on “The Cost of Malicious Cyber Activity to the U.S. Economy” (February 2018) is to be believed, the cost that malicious cyber activity imposed on the U.S. economy in 2016 alone ranges from $57 billion to a staggering $109 billion. According to Gartner, firms worldwide spent $81.6 billion on information security in that same year. The comparison between the costs of malicious cyber activity on the U.S. economy and the amount of money spent worldwide on cybersecurity does not tell very much—it’s unknown, for example, how much was spent on cybersecurity in the United States alone; it’s unknown what the costs to the U.S. economy would have been if the amount spent on cybersecurity had not been spent; it’s unknown what the additional costs might have been for the cybersecurity measures that would have eliminated the $57 billion to $109 billion in costs to the U.S. economy (if elimination of all costs would even be possible); and it’s unknown whether the costs of measures necessary to reduce the costs of malicious cyber activity are asymptotic. “That is, do the costs of eliminating risk approach infinity as the remaining costs of malicious cyber activity approach zero—and if so, where is the crossover point between cost-effective and money-wasting expenditures on cyber security?” Taylor asks.