Perspective: ImmigrationHow Immigration Can Make Some U.K.-Born Residents Feel Worse Off Even If They Aren’t

Published 9 September 2019

Worries about the effects of immigration are prevalent in politics across Europe and the U.S. In the U.K., for instance, concerns over immigration dominate much of the Brexit debate. For many, immigrants are seen as a source of competition for jobs and access to public services (irrespective of whether this is true or not). Peter Howley writes in The Conversation that despite the intuitive appeal of this argument, empirical evidence to support it is lacking. The explanation for the negative perception of immigration is rather found in subjective well-being, and the effects of immigration on subjective well-being were found to be more negative and more notable in certain subgroups. These groups include relatively older people (those over 60), those with low household incomes, and/or the unemployed. “The main concern with these findings is that if – despite positive economic benefits– immigration is associated with adverse effects on the subjective well-being of certain groups in society, then this makes the challenge of integration more difficult,” Howley writes.

Worries about the effects of immigration are prevalent in politics across Europe and the U.S. In the U.K., for instance, concerns over immigration dominate much of the Brexit debate. For many, immigrants are seen as a source of competition for jobs and access to public services (irrespective of whether this is true or not).

Peter Howley writes in The Conversationthat despite the intuitive appeal of this argument, empirical evidence to support it is lacking. One reason for this is that although migrants enter the labor market, they create jobs too by using the wages they earn to support economic activity in the local economy. Another reason is that migrants tend to complement, as opposed to compete against, existing workers by often doing the tasks others don’t want to do.

A further commonly expressed concern relates to whether migrants contribute their “fair share” to the tax and welfare system. These concerns are also largely unfounded. Migrants in the U.K., for example, are substantive net contributors to the public purse. This is because migrants tend, on average, to be more likely to be at work and less likely to access social services.

In short, immigration does not appear to have any appreciable negative impact on jobs. Meanwhile, migrants partly subsidize the costs of public services for others.

“Focusing on the economic effects of immigration may, however, only tell us part of the story,” Howley writes. “In new research, my colleagues and I examined how rises in immigration into local areas affected different people’s self-reported sense of well-being, as opposed to actual economic well-being. We found some interesting patterns.”

Using measure of subjective well-being, commonly referred to as the General Health Questionnaire (which measures anxiety, social dysfunction and general happiness), Howley found that for certain sub-groups, the effects of immigration on subjective well-being were more negative and more notable in certain subgroups:

These groups include relatively older people (those over 60), those with low household incomes, and/or the unemployed. These well-being differences across sub-groups closely mirrored voting patterns in the recent UK referendum on EU membership.

He concludes:

The main concern with these findings is that if – despite positive economic benefits– immigration is associated with adverse effects on the subjective well-being of certain groups in society, then this makes the challenge of integration more difficult.

Going forward, focusing on people’s subjective well-being as opposed to pure economic indicators may help us understand more about the forces shaping anti-immigration attitudes in the UK – and the rise of this sentiment across Europe.