PerspectiveEighteen Years On: The War on Terror Comes of Age
Later this year, a U.S. service member is likely to be deployed to Afghanistan who was not yet born on September 11, 2001, when al-Qaeda terrorists launched the most devastating terrorist attack in history and killed almost 3,000 people, mostly Americans. The years in between have seen wars in Iraq and Syria justified in the name of counterterrorism as well as more limited U.S. interventions against jihadi groups in Libya, Somalia, and other countries. “Hundreds of thousands have died in these conflicts—some from terrorism, but most from combat and the associated ravages of war,” Daniel Byman writes. “Yet even as this body count soared, neither al-Qaeda nor other jihadi groups have proven able to conduct a repeat of 9/11 or even anything close to it.” He notes that judging the threat that jihadi terrorism currently poses to the United States and, more broadly, the success of the U.S.-led struggle against various jihadi groups in the post-9/11 era depends on what interests are prioritized and which perspective one takes. “Before Americans celebrate or despair, however, it is useful to take stock of the problems facing the main jihadi organizations themselves.”
Later this year, a U.S. service member is likely to be deployed to Afghanistan who was not yet born on September 11, 2001, when al-Qaeda terrorists launched the most devastating terrorist attack in history and killed almost 3,000 people, mostly Americans. The years in between have seen wars in Iraq and Syria justified in the name of counterterrorism as well as more limited U.S. interventions against jihadi groups in Libya, Somalia, and other countries. “Hundreds of thousands have died in these conflicts—some from terrorism, but most from combat and the associated ravages of war,” Daniel Byman writes for West Point’s Combatting Terrorism Center. “Yet even as this body count soared, neither al-Qaeda nor other jihadi groups have proven able to conduct a repeat of 9/11 or even anything close to it.”
He continues:
Judging the threat that jihadi terrorism currently poses to the United States and, more broadly, the success of the U.S.-led struggle against various jihadi groups in the post-9/11 era depends on what interests are prioritized and which perspective one takes. Under three very different administrations, the United States has scored impressive successes against al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and other jihadi groups, decimating their leadership and limiting attacks on the U.S. homeland to a fraction of what Americans feared in the aftermath of 9/11. Yet, almost two decades after 9/11, the United States has still not put the nail in the coffin of jihadis. Indeed, although the operational freedom of jihadi groups is constricted by U.S. and allied counterterrorism efforts, the jihadi cause as a whole has far more local and regional influence than it did in the years before 9/11, it is better able to inspire individuals in the West to act on its behalf, and groups have proven resilient despite the fierce U.S.-led onslaught. Americans are wearying of grinding conflicts in Afghanistan, Syria, and other countries and favor, at most, limited efforts in far-flung theaters like Somalia or West Africa where jihadis are active. Efforts to pass the burden onto allies have met little success in most parts of the world, with a few important exceptions like the French counterterrorism campaign in Mali.
Before Americans celebrate or despair, however, it is useful to take stock of the problems facing the main jihadi organizations themselves.
