Perspective: China syndromeWe’re Underestimating China’s Impact on Governance in Latin America: Three Persistent Myths
China’s growing engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) in recent years has captured the attention of policymakers, business leaders and foreign policy observers across the region. Jessica Ludwig writes that much of this discussion has focused on the economic dimensions of the relationship. “But largely absent from the conversation has been a serious, dedicated look at the normative impact of relations with Beijing on governance—and, in particular, on whether closer relationships with China’s party-state authorities will affect prospects for democracy in a region that has—at least theoretically—adopted a consensus around democratic values,” Ludwig writes. “Without a firm, well-rounded foundation of knowledge about China and the priorities of its political leadership, LAC countries are starting from a significantly disadvantaged position when negotiating the terms of the relationship.”
China’s growing engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) in recent years has captured the attention of policymakers, business leaders and foreign policy observers across the region. It seems nearly everyone these days wants to talk about China’s evolving presence and role in the region.
Jessica Ludwig writes in Global Americans that much of this discussion has focused on the economic dimensions of the relationship, occasionally spilling over into concerns about the local social and environmental impact where Chinese companies or state-backed financing banks are involved. More recently, observers have also taken an interest in China’s global export of technology and what it could mean for the region’s development prospects.
She adds:
But largely absent from the conversation has been a serious, dedicated look at the normative impact of relations with Beijing on governance—and, in particular, on whether closer relationships with China’s party-state authorities will affect prospects for democracy in a region that has—at least theoretically—adopted a consensus around democratic values. At the same time, China has invested in a growing number of initiatives designed to shape public opinion and perceptions around the region, ranging from people-to-people exchanges, cultural activities, educational partnerships and programs, as well as media enterprises and information initiatives—a phenomenon that is even more apparent at the global level.
These activities targeting the ideas-realm are often interpreted as nothing more than China’s efforts at public diplomacy and are typically understood through the familiar lens of “soft power.” But consider for a moment whether LAC countries might be miscalculating the scope of Beijing’s interests and aims—particularly those of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its chairman, Xi Jinping.
Underpinning the predominant paradigm about China in LAC are three persistent myths that merit revisiting before dismissing China’s impact on governance institutions in the region as limited.
Myth #1: China’s interests in LAC are principally—and therefore, solely—economic
Myth #2: China does not interfere in other countries’ internal affairs
Myth #3: What we think we know about China in Latin America
Ludwig concludes:
Looking beyond China’s economic relationship with the region to assess the form, tone and effects of its engagement with Latin American and Caribbean societies, it is evident that Beijing relies on opacity, controlled access, and manipulative discourse to limit the space for discussion about China in the region. These efforts are more appropriately characterized as “sharp power” and require a closer degree of scrutiny to inventory, monitor, and contextualize than those who follow the region have previously paid attention to. Sharp power influence poses a serious risk to the integrity of the information environment in which decisions are made about how to manage relations with China.
At the heart of this issue is whether leaders, policymakers, and societies across the Western Hemisphere are adequately equipped and prepared to anticipate how to secure, protect, and promote their own national and institutional interests as they engage with the CCP leadership in Beijing.
Without a firm, well-rounded foundation of knowledge about China and the priorities of its political leadership, LAC countries are starting from a significantly disadvantaged position when negotiating the terms of the relationship. If Latin American societies do not know their own strategic advantages or identify spaces to maneuver and secure their own interests, how can they ensure that the relationship is truly win-win with no strings attached? And more importantly, how can they ensure agreements with China do not violate the rule of law or undermine the integrity of their own values and governance institutions?
An approach that considers the three myths described above is a starting point to rethink the conversation, develop transparent relationships with China’s party-state authorities and secure democracy in the region.
