Argument: Russia’s Soft PowerFive Faces of Russia’s Soft Power: Far Left, Far Right, Orthodox Christian, Russophone, and Ethnoreligious Networks

Does Russia exercise true “soft power”—the power of attraction—in any significant measure? Şener Aktürk writes in PONARS Eurasia that while some argue that the power Russia exerts is not really soft power, “I suggest Russia’s soft power may be at least as great as its hard power in international politics.”

He writes:

·  “There are at least five different categories of foreign audiences that espouse a pro-Russian geopolitical identity, all united by an opposition to liberalism. In addition to pro-Russian far right parties and networks, which have attracted most of the attention of scholars and journalists, there are also far left, Orthodox Christian, Russophone, and various ethnoreligious and separatist groups that favor a pro-Russian geopolitical identity.”

·  “European far right parties with pro-Russian geopolitical preferences are probably the most studied” among the pro-Russian political parties and movements in the West. The most notable among them: The National Rally (RN; formerly FN, for Front National) in France; the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ); the Northern League (LN) under the leadership of Matteo Salvini in Italy; Alternative for Germany (AfD) in Germany; Vox in Spain; Jobbik in Hungary; UKIP in Britain; and Vlaams Belang in Belgium [we may add the Sweden Democrats in Sweden; Golden Dawn in Greece; Ataka in Bulgaria; the Danish People’s Party in Denmark; True Finns in Finland; and some elements on the U.S. populist Right, which “learns from the European populist Right, where Putin is seen as a champion of nationalism and traditional social values and as a reliable opponent of Islamism,” according to National Review’s Nicholas Frankovich].

“Far right parties mostly see Russia as the defender or savior of a white, Christian-heritage, European civilization, both against an alleged Islamic invasion through immigration and refugee flows, but also against socially liberal policies such as legislation allowing for same sex marriages.”

·  “During international crises that involve Russia, such as Russia’s annexation of Crimea or its intervention to support the Assad regime in Syria, these pro-Russian groups with seemingly irreconcilable views on domestic politics, may mobilize to pressure their governments to adopt a more pro-Russian foreign policy position than would be expected otherwise.”

·  “Increasing resentment against U.S. foreign policy, neoliberal market economics, globalization and/or liberal democracy, as well as opposition to more specific policies identified with Western liberalism such as same-sex marriage legislation, provide opportunities and justifications for otherwise seemingly irreconcilable groups to adopt pro-Russian geopolitical preferences.”