PerspectivePandemics and the U.S. Military: Lessons from 1918
The novel coronavirus will hit the U.S. military and its allies hard — how hard will depend on a number of variables, some having to do with the virus itself (how and to what extent it mutates, whether it comes back in subsequent waves, etc.) and others having to do with what measures militaries take to protect themselves. Michael Shurkin writes that, fortunately, we have a historical example that could offer some clues on how the virus might affect the military, and the policy choices that at some point today’s military leaders may face. He is referring to the 1918 influenza epidemic — commonly referred to as the Spanish flu.
The novel coronavirus will hit the U.S. military and its allies hard, as already there have been outbreaks at the Marine Corps boot camp at Parris Island and on the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt. How hard will depend on a number of variables — some having to do with the virus itself (how and to what extent it mutates, whether it comes back in subsequent waves, etc.) and others having to do with what measures militaries take to protect themselves. But it would be foolhardy to underestimate the damage COVID-19 could do.
Michael Shurkin writes in War on the Rocks that, fortunately, we have a historical example that could offer some clues on how the virus might affect the military, the kinds of policies that might exacerbate or mitigate the pandemic’s impact, and the policy choices that at some point today’s military leaders may face.
I am speaking, of course, of the 1918 influenza epidemic — commonly referred to as the Spanish flu, although experts agree it had nothing to do with Spain. They are not, in fact, sure where it came from, though the outbreak in the United States clearly began in March 1918 in Kansas, and from there it spread Europe thanks in large measure to the flow of U.S. troops to France.
The 1918 pandemic placed America’s military leadership in the position of having to make difficult choices. The disease was killing soldiers, sailors, and marines, undermining readiness and the Army’s ability to fight. Measures to protect the force and the many civilians it came in contact with, however, likewise hindered readiness and, most importantly, threatened to throttle mobilization. 1918, it must be remembered, was the year of Germany’s great spring offensive, which aimed to defeat the exsanguinated allies before the United States was able to make its full weight felt on the battlefield. From March to July, the outcome of the war hung in the balance, and what the allies needed more than anything to prevail was American manpower as quickly as possible. They made the choice to prioritize mobilization, accepting the human toll as a grim necessity.
Fortunately, military leaders today face a more benign security environment than their predecessors a century ago. The U.S. military is engaged in military operations abroad, but it is not fighting a great-power war. As a result, the Pentagon has every reason to do everything in its power to stem the current pandemic — even if it has to absorb some downgrade in readiness.
