PerspectiveNegotiating with Jihadists in the Sahel and Nigeria
Though the United States may be drawing down its forces in Western Africa, France, the other foreign power operating in the Sahel, has boosted troop numbers in the region from 4,500 to 5,100. Jacob Zenn, the author, most recently, of Unmasking Boko Haram: Exploring Global Jihad in Nigeria, writes that the increase came as a response to a January meeting with the G5 Sahel (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger) that affirmed the Sahel’s top security threat is the Islamic State’s local affiliate, popularly known as the Islamic State in Greater Sahara (ISGS), which is formally part of the Islamic State’s West African Province.
Though the United States may be drawing down its forces in Western Africa, France, the other foreign power operating in the Sahel, has boosted troop numbers in the region from 4,500 to 5,100. Jacob Zenn, the author, most recently, of Unmasking Boko Haram: Exploring Global Jihad in Nigeria, writes in Lawfarethat the increase came as a response to a January meeting with the G5 Sahel (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger) that affirmed the Sahel’s top security threat is the Islamic State’s local affiliate, popularly known as the Islamic State in Greater Sahara (ISGS), which is formally part of the Islamic State’s West African Province.
Zenn adds:
France and the G5 Sahel’s counter-ISGS operations since January align them with another ISGS enemy: al-Qaeda’s regional affiliate, Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). To be sure, France and the G5 Sahel are hardly JNIM’s friends. However, just as the United States recognizes that it shares mutual interests with the Taliban to counter the Islamic State’s local organization in Afghanistan, France, the G5 Sahel and JNIM all want to see ISGS’s downfall.
….
Although negotiations with JNIM seem more likely than with any other jihadist groups in the Sahel or neighboring northern Nigeria, where Boko Haram and its offshoots operate, all groups in the region have revealed their positions on negotiations through words and deeds. Given that combat with Sahelian and Nigerian jihadists has lasted a decade with no end in sight, it is worth taking stock of where JNIM, Boko Haram and related regional jihadist groups stand on the potential for diplomatic engagement.
….
Altogether, the military option has been employed more consistently than negotiation. Nevertheless, the latter is possible at the tactical level with all Sahelian and Nigerian jihadist groups: They are not “faceless.” Should governments prioritize negotiation instead of what appears to be unending war, they may be able to build on successes achieved by non-state actors, including non-religious-based mediators, to make inroads with these groups. Some innovation, determination and sincerity are needed.
