Argument: SeaplanesBring Back the Seaplane

Published 1 July 2020

On 8 December 1941, Japan attacked the Philippines and destroyed nearly half of the U.S. Army Air Corps’ bombers along with a third of its fighters on the ground. Yet, 43 of 45 Navy patrol aircraft survived the day. David Alman writes that the reason for such a stark difference in survival is simple: In accordance with pre-war plans, the 45 aircraft of Patrol Wing 10 had dispersed to various lakes, beaches, rivers, and bays throughout the Philippines. Japan was left hunting for small groups of seaplanes over thousands of square miles of water and coastline, and eventually gave up. Alman argues that seaplanes should be seriously considered – or rather, reconsidered – as one measure to mitigate China’s growing capabilities in east Asia and the Pacific: Seaplanes do not rely on runways or fixed bases. They do not rely on basing rights. They can operate over long distances at relatively high speeds and, contrary to popular opinion, can do so in bad weather.

On 8 December 1941, Japan attacked the Philippines and destroyed nearly half of the U.S. Army Air Corps’ bombers along with a third of its fighters on the ground. Yet, 43 of 45 Navy patrol aircraft survived the day. David Alman writes in War on the Rocks that the reason for such a stark difference in survival is simple: In accordance with pre-war plans, the 45 aircraft of Patrol Wing 10 had dispersed to various lakes, beaches, rivers, and bays throughout the Philippines. The aircraft — PBY Catalina seaplanes — continued the fight from their ever-changing sea bases. Alman notes that Japan was left hunting for small groups of seaplanes over thousands of square miles of water and coastline.

“While the seaplanes alone were unable to change the course of the battle, and ultimately suffered grievous losses later in the campaign when pressed into action as bombers without fighter escort, their initial survival demonstrated a unique capability that should be considered today,” he writes, adding:

As the National Defense Strategy demands, the Marine Corps is currently demonstrating, and the new Air Force chief of staff has discussed, the challenges posed by an increasingly capable Chinese military demand innovation and disruptive thinking in the Pentagon. Innovation requires strategists to consider all options on the table. Moreover, it requires all options to be placed on the table in the first place. One option noticeably absent from most debates on future operations in the Pacific Ocean is the seaplane.

There are reasons why seaplanes could help military planners mitigate some of the enduring operational challenges in the Indo-Pacific region: Seaplanes do not rely on runways or fixed bases. They do not rely on basing rights. They can operate over long distances at relatively high speeds and, contrary to popular opinion, can do so in bad weather. They can carry cargo, people, weapons, or fuel and act as aerial refuelers or strike aircraft themselves. “In short, seaplanes could play a significant role in augmenting current operations and act as an essential component of the future force.”

Alman concludes:

While they are not an antidote to all of the challenges the U.S. military faces in the Western Pacific, seaplanes could provide numerous benefits to the joint force. Some authors are starting to write about the utility of seaplanes in more detail; this should only continue. Whether they are worth the cost and their own constraints is up to analysts and strategists to decide after considering them as an option. To disregard a whole category of military capability without due diligence would be a disservice to every servicemember potentially tasked with fighting America’s wars, and also to every legislator forced to choose where to allocate the nation’s finite resources.