ARGUMENT: Disturbing overreachI Ran the DHS Intelligence Unit. Its Reports on Journalists are Concerning.
The intelligence arm of the Department of Homeland Security, known as the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS I&A), has been the subject of extensive criticism recently, first for questionable intelligence support to law enforcement in Portland, Oregon, and then for its deeply problematic intelligence reports naming U.S. journalists reporting on I&A’s own actions. Gen. Francis X. Taylor (USAF, retd), who served as under-secretary of intelligence and analysis at the Department of Homeland Security from 2014 to January 2017, writes that the investigation of the mistakes DHS I&A made in Portland and in reporting on journalists “should focus not only on personnel on the ground, but—more importantly—on those who demanded that the intelligence agency depart from its guidelines,” and he adds that “it is important to distinguish between the danger of I&A acting beyond its authority and the value that the office can provide when it works well.”
The intelligence arm of the Department of Homeland Security, known as the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS I&A), has been the subject of extensive criticism recently, first for questionable intelligence support to law enforcement in Portland, Oregon, and then for its deeply problematic intelligence reports naming U.S. journalists reporting on I&A’s own actions. Reviews are now underway on what exactly I&A did, but the material that has become public so far is concerning.
Gen. Francis X. Taylor (USAF, retd), who served as under-secretary of intelligence and analysis at the Department of Homeland Security from 2014 to January 2017, writes in Lawfare that “If the facts are confirmed, the office that took these actions is not the I&A I led—nor the one that has operated for nearly two decades.”
Taylor adds:
Writing on Lawfare on July 20, Steve Vladeck and Benjamin Wittes suggested that I&A was justifying its intelligence operations in Portland, Oregon, through a new executive order on protection of statues and memorials. This is a significant expansion of the agency’s role in monitoring civil protest, and there are serious questions whether the order justifies I&A’s actions as a matter of law.
Of even greater concern, it came to light last week that I&A personnel had written and disseminated intelligence reports about journalists who reported on I&A actions. Even under the guise of cybersecurity or identifying leaks, this appears to be a clear misuse of intelligence authorities and a violation of I&A’s own guidelines, especially for journalists who enjoy substantial First Amendment protections.
He concludes:
It certainly appears that DHS made mistakes concerning I&A’s support to law enforcement in Portland and its activity writing reports on journalists. The DHS inspector general and Congress are conducting reviews, as is appropriate. Investigators should focus not only on personnel on the ground, but—more importantly—on those who demanded that the intelligence agency depart from its guidelines.
But it is important to distinguish between the danger of I&A acting beyond its authority and the value that the office can provide when it works well. This agency is important to homeland security, and the U.S. needs its personnel to be successful in collecting, analyzing and sharing information on homeland threats in order to keep Americans protected.
