ARGUMENT: The “Forever War”On 9/11, Interrogating the Assumptions that Undergird the “Forever War”

For nearly two decades, the 11^th of September has been a solemn one, dedicated to remembering those lost in the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Luke Hartig, who served as Senior Director for Counterterrorism at the National Security Council (NSC), writes in Just Security that it is a day to remember the sense of national unity Americans felt around a common purpose after 9/11.” During my years in government, it was a day when we gathered to remember how 9/11 drew so many of us into public service and to remind ourselves of the noble mission we had the privilege to carry out,” he writes.

He says it is time to reflect on the past nineteen years and “hopefully emerge with a renewed sense of purpose.” He adds:

But as the pain and trauma of that day has receded in recent years, the anniversary of 9/11 has also become a reminder of a fact we would have found inconceivable at the time: that we continue to wage war some two decades later. A war that started out with relatively clear aims against specific enemies has long since morphed into a “Forever War,” comprising a diverse range of conflicts, most of which are only tenuously tied to the attacks of 9/11 and the original response to them against al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

This year, with COVID-19 soon to claim its 200,000th American victim, questions about why we’re still dedicating so many resources to fighting overseas terrorist groups are rendered particularly stark. Calls across the political spectrum to end the Forever War, already loud in an election year, have only been amplified. Yet resolving to end endless wars is easier than actually concluding them. Experts have noted the complexity and risk of withdrawing from key theaters and have emphasized the need for continued U.S. military presence – or slowly phased drawdowns – in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere as a check against the resurgence of al-Qaeda and ISIS.Determining how to end the Forever War will likely be a top foreign policy priority in the coming months, regardless of who wins the White House. The U.S. counterterrorism campaign has gone through many evolutions over the past 19 years, but several core assumptions about the enemy, our ability to defend against attacks, and the offensive actions necessary to degrade terrorist groups remain largely unchanged. There is a lot we don’t know and there are risks to every decision; risks of over-investing in counterterrorism and underinvesting in something else, risks of the opposite. But as we contemplate our future policy decisions, we must weigh the facts and examine our assumptions closely.