ARGUMENT: China watchChina’s Military Tech Ambitions – What’s the U.S.- EU Gameplan?

Published 5 March 2021

A key test of the Biden era of transatlantic relations will be the issue of how the United States and the European Union respond to China’s aggressive efforts to seize market share and industrial knowledge in areas of technology that are critical to national security. Kathleen Doherty writes that the Europeans are divided and have been reluctant to rein in Chinese technological capabilities and ambitions. “The United States and the European Union (EU) have no time to waste in finding a common (or at least complementary) approach.”

A key test of the Biden era of transatlantic relations will be the issue of how the United States and the European Union respond to China’s aggressive efforts to seize market share and industrial knowledge in areas of technology that are critical to national security. Kathleen Doherty writes in Just Security that the Europeans, divided over the question whether China is an immediate military threat, despite some restrictions on Chinese company Huawei, have been reluctant to rein in Chinese technological capabilities and ambitions. China will continue to try to drive a wedge between allies, while building up its military use of emerging technologies. Since acting alone or with trepidation would undermine security on both sides of the Atlantic, the United States and the European Union (EU) have no time to waste in finding a common (or at least complementary) approach.

Doherty adds:

Under the Trump administration, much of the focus was over the issue of Chinese telecom giant Huawei’s involvement in fifth generation (5G) infrastructure. As a result of aggressive U.S. lobbying, and some acknowledgement that Huawei is a high-risk supplier, several – but not all – European governments have aligned themselves with the United States and placed restrictions on Huawei. Notably, Deutsche Telecom is still rolling out its use of Huawei equipment. While important to have a U.S.-EU consensus about high-risk suppliers such as Huawei, there are other significant policy areas at play, among them:

·  Chinese investment in and acquisition of companies developing leading-edge digital technologies and those involved in artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, biotechnology, and additive manufacturing, for example – all of which have national security elements, as a recent Congressional Research Service report laid out.

·  The export of sensitive technology and potential dual-use technology that can be employed for military use to China.

How these issues are addressed will be a key determinant in whether China reaches its goal to surpass American and European high-tech military capabilities. While China is indigenously developing its AI and other leading-edge technologies, it still heavily depends on high-tech imports and the technical know-how gained through acquisitions. Europe has a growing number of startups in AI and other emerging technologies and is a leading exporter of high-tech products to China. The goal should be to have U.S. and EU policies in these areas synched up. But while the United States has effective measures in place in both areas; Europe’s are lacking.

Doherty writes that given the division among EU member states on these questions, an EU-wide consensus would require high-level courage. This is unlikely since this year will determine if and how the newly concluded EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment will be implemented. “But waiting for a better time is a bet against the future when China’s technological gains could be even greater security threats. The Biden administration should work with its European allies to find the courage to implement rigorous and meaningful measures to address the threats posed by China’s military tech.”