China watchMessaging Authoritarianism: China’s Four Messaging Pillars and How ‘Wolf Warrior’ Tactics Undermine Them

By Rachael Dean Wilson

Published 12 April 2021

A messaging strategy is only as good as the goal it serves; as Xi Jinping has made clear, China is seeking to make the world safer for its brand of authoritarianism by reshaping the world order. An analysis of messaging from China’s diplomats, state-backed media, and leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) demonstrates that Beijing repeatedly uses narratives, angles, and comparisons that serve to change perceptions about China’s autocracy and the United States’ democracy—to China’s advantage.

A messaging strategy is only as good as the goal it serves; as Xi Jinping has made clear, China is seeking to make the world safer for its brand of authoritarianism by reshaping the world order. An analysis of messaging from China’s diplomats, state-backed media, and leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) demonstrates that Beijing repeatedly uses narratives, angles, and comparisons that serve to change perceptions about China’s autocracy and the United States’ democracy—to China’s advantage. However, Chinese officials’ recent embrace of increasingly aggressive “wolf warrior” diplomacy, a more assertive and combative communications tactic, threatens the success of China’s overarching messaging strategy.

China has long executed international propaganda campaigns to promote China’s worldview. In recent years, the CCP has significantly increased the efficacy and reach of its foreign-directed media by engaging new media markets, expanding language capabilities beyond Chinese and English, increasing China’s official presence on Western social media platforms, and leveraging foreign voices to give legitimacy to CCP talking points. Xi gave direction to those propaganda efforts in 2013 at the National Propaganda and Ideology Conference when he first underscored the importance of “telling China’s story well” to international audiences, an overarching objective of Xi’s propaganda strategy.

However, telling China’s story well, while important, is only part of the strategy. According to Anne-Marie Brady, Xi’s communications efforts aim to “influence international perceptions about China, shape international debates about the Chinese government and strengthen management over Chinese-language public sphere.” For a positive message to be most effective it is usually accompanied by a negative message, creating a compelling contrast between two options. Take, for example, U.S. political campaigns. Every two years voters must endure a barrage of negative ads for one reason: they work. In changing perceptions, drawing contrast between two candidates is simply more powerful than positive messages alone.

The same messaging principles can be applied to competing visions—one authoritarian, the other democratic—for the international system. In addition to positive coverage of its rich culture, autocratic system, and technological prowess, official messaging from China also spotlights how democracy is failing to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century—and failing its own people. In examining statements by CCP officials, coverage in Chinese state-backed media, and comments by Chinese diplomats, four key pillars of China’s messaging strategy emerge: promoting China’s culture and competence, boosting authoritarianism by denigrating democracy, co-opting the legitimacy of democratic language, and creating the appearance of moral equivalence.