ARGUMENT: The Troubles reduxBelfast Tinderbox: Why Loyalists Are in the Streets This Spring
The violence that broke out in Northern Ireland earlier this month raised fears that sectarian conflict would return after decades of uneasy peace. Carolyn Gallaher and Kimberly Cowell-Meyers write that the latest unrest draws on many of the players during the so-called “Troubles” but that today’s politics, particularly disputes over Brexit, are driving much of the violence.
On 7 April, young people in the Protestant community in the Shankill Road area of Belfast commandeered a bus and set it on fire. Later that night, Protestant and Catholic youth hurled incendiary devices at one another across so-called peace lines—formal and informal barriers that separate places where the two communities border one another. This capped a week of unrest across Northern Ireland. Since the violence started, 88 police officers have been injured.
Carolyn Gallaher and Kimberly Cowell-Meyers write in Lawfare that violence at interfaces between Protestant and Catholic communities was common during Northern Ireland’s 30-year conflict (1968-1998), known locally as “the Troubles.”
The conflict was sectarian and ethno-nationalist. Unionists, who are typically Protestant, believe Northern Ireland should remain part of the United Kingdom. Nationalists, who tend to be Catholic and see themselves as Irish, believe Northern Ireland should be part of the Republic of Ireland. Each side had paramilitaries willing to use violence to pursue their ends. Unionists leaned on loyalist paramilitaries—the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster Defence Association (UDA)—while nationalists relied on republican ones—most notably the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA).
Low-level street violence has continued in the post-agreement period. These clashes are so common in the summer months that journalists have nicknamed them “recreational rioting.” In May, June, and July, when the sun sets at 11 p.m., teenagers on both sides of the religious divide often gather at hotspots to throw rocks, launch homemade incendiary devices, and yell insults at one another. July is especially intense due to unionist commemorations of Protestant victories in the 17th century.
The recent violence looks similar, but two things set it apart. First, violence has been concentrated in loyalist communities, and second, it is broadly connected to loyalist paramilitaries’ recent rejection of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA), which formally ended the Troubles 23 years ago. The GFA created a power-sharing government between unionists and nationalists, among other structural reforms. This spring’s conflagration is the result of fallout from Brexit overlapping with the continuing influence of paramilitaries despite the Good Friday Agreement.
Gallaher and Cowell-Meyers write that the loyalist groups aren’t as cohesive or disciplined as they were during the Troubles (and even then, they weren’t as disciplined or cohesive as the IRA). Over time, centralized command structures have weakened. Many of the old guard, who negotiated the 1994 cease-fires and the 1998 peace accord, have been sidelined. “Pop-up gangs” are also in the mix. These are often small groups of young men who occasionally coordinate with paramilitary leaders for protests or riots, but they aren’t beholden to or controlled by them.
The authors conclude:
The question is which part of loyalism will set strategy and tactics moving forward….
It may be difficult to stem the violence if its perpetrators see it as useful and there is no leadership to control it. There is little room for the British government to concede to unionist/loyalist demands on the protocol. And, unfortunately, policing alone won’t solve this problem. The political and social dimensions underlying the recent violence will ultimately have to be addressed by the unionist and loyalist communities.
