From Gradualists to Jihadists: Islamists in the West

It should be noted, however, that this paper does not argue for legal sanctions or actions to be taken against the groups using these narratives.

It is hoped that greater emphasis on the political dimensions of Islamism presented in this paper could serve to combat the narratives behind radicalization, reduce conflation of Islamism as an ideology and Islam as a faith, and ensure programming is more targeted.

Introduction
In the 21st Century, the dual threat of state communism and state fascism have largely faded from view, but another set of “fanatically held social and political doctrines” to those described by Isaiah Berlin have been unleashed on the world.(1)

Individuals and groups adhering to militant Islamism, a political ideology underpinned by a strict and literalist interpretation of religion, have claimed tens of thousands of lives around the world. They have provoked the might of the most powerful military alliance in history and in recent years the appeal of their utopian ideal has convinced thousands to abandon their lives and travel to join the brutal Islamic State experiment in Iraq and Syria. In the process they have destroyed lives and entire communities and permanently scarred parts of the Middle East.

The field of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) and domestic terrorism prevention efforts (such as the UK’s Prevent Strategy) have sought not only to divert individuals from being radicalized into groups like Al-Qaeda and Islamic State, but to challenge the ideology of violent extremist groups.(2)

In the case of Salafi-Jihadist groups, the global efforts to challenge Salafi-Jihadism through counter-narrative campaigns and community projects have often been unfocussed or imprecise in expressing how the project will challenge the core tenets of the ideology. In fact, the ideology remains poorly understood across the mainstream in many Western countries, and there have also been concerted efforts to downplay the role of ideology in motivating Jihadist violence,(3)  CVE and counter-terrorism policies have suffered as a result.

Not only this, but public discourse, which has been trapped in a polarizing debate which posits that Jihadist ideology is either everything or “nothing to do with religion”, has impacted on policy as well. Many projects have attempted to tackle peripheral issues, such as building critical thinking skills and online safety, or reducing the impact of perceived structural drivers (such as poverty or lack of education) of violent extremism. In other instances, they have focused on women’s rights or tolerance and homophobia, and while Islamist and Jihadist groups are recognized as patriarchal and homophobic, these are not core tenets of the ideology.

In recent years though, there have been increased efforts to tackle the theological underpinning of Jihadist violence. However, projects which sit at either end of this polarized debate have largely failed to recognize Jihadism as the violent avant-garde of a global political movement called Islamism. As one Belgian counter-terrorism official and academic put it, Al-Qaeda is an “epiphenomenon”, and is only the most visible manifestation of the much larger Islamist movement.(4)

This guidance document makes the case that in the absence of widespread expertise to tackle the theological underpinnings of Jihadist violence, a higher priority should be placed on undermining, delegitimizing and challenging the political narratives and political beliefs and objectives which legitimize and sanction the violence.

The political ideology underpinning Jihadist violence borrows and builds upon the ideological doctrines of Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, and Osama Bin Laden’s worldview was heavily influenced by Muslim Brotherhood ideologues such as Sayyid Qutb, as explained in detail in the 9/11 Commission Report.(5)

Although there are bitter disagreements relating to tactics across the spectrum of political Islam (Islamism), from the gradualists of the Muslim Brotherhood to the revolutionaries of Hizb ut-Tahrir and the offensive Jihadists of Al-Qaeda, there is considerable overlap in the political narratives propagated by these groups, and individuals and groups have moved along the spectrum from the less militant to more militant expressions of this ideology.(6)

This guidance does not seek to make a judgement on rolling debates surrounding the legitimacy of engaging “non-violent” Islamist groups in certain contexts, nor to make a moral judgement on the worth of their political objectives. This guidance recognizes that groups like Islamic State would readily consider the likes of the Muslim Brotherhood as apostates for their willingness to work within democratic frameworks, and conversely that many Islamists are horrified by the ultra-violence of such groups (although conflicted relationships to violence will be explored later in this paper).

With this in mind, and in order to both uphold democratic values and prevent individual radicalization, this guidance makes the case for countering the political narratives deployed to varying degrees by both non-violent Islamists and violent Jihadists. Furthermore, the hope is that by considering Islamism as a political ideology rather than simply as an extension of the Islamic faith, we can contribute to overcoming the frequently misplaced cultural and religious sensitivities surrounding Islamism.

There is no shortage of individuals who have embraced Jihadist ideology after being introduced to Islamist narratives in wider mainstream society, from institutions platforming Jihadist clerics like Anwar Al-Awlaki and Abu Qatada to pushing the narrative of Western hostility to Islam and Muslims. As described by his chronicler Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, Anwar Al-Awlaki himself only had to make “painless” and “minute” adjustments to his belief system to move along the spectrum to militant Jihadism.(7)

.It is therefore in the interest of democratic states and civil society to push back and counter the divisive narratives identified in this paper. This guidance seeks to help political leaders, civil society and practitioners to understand and identify the key themes which are shared across the Islamist spectrum, as well as suggestions and recommendations for countering those very narratives.

1. Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts Of Liberty,” Four Essays On Liberty (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 118-172 https://cactus.dixie.edu/green/B_Readings/I_Berlin%20Two%20Concpets%20of%20Liberty.pdf

2. One stated objective of the UK’s Prevent Strategy is to “respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism.” Prevent Strategy, HM Government, June 2011 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf

3. Jeffrey M. Bale, “Denying the Link between Islamist Ideology and Jihadist Terrorism: “Political Correctness” and the Undermining of Counterterrorism”, Perspectives on Terrorism Vol 7 No 5 (2013) http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index. php/pot/article/view/290/html

4. Quote attributed to Alai Grignard, deputy head of Belgian Police anti-terror unit and professor of Islamic Studies at Brussels Free University: Sylvain Besson, La Conquête de L’occident (Paris; Seuill, 2005) p.40

5. “The 9/11 Commission Report”, United States Government, July 22 2004 https://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf

6. Men like Abdullah Azzam, the ‘father of modern Jihad,’ and current Al-Qaeda leader Aymen Al-Zawahiri are both formerly Muslim Brotherhood members having adopted a much more offensively minded strategy. Similarly, Hamas was originally established as the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, and uses militant tactics like attacks on civilians and suicide bombings justified by their interpretation of Jihad.

7. Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, “As American as Apple Pie: How Anwar Al-Awlaki Became the Face of Western Jihad”, ICSR, 2011 p. 259 https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/ICSR-Report-As-American-As-…