Iran’s Strategic Challenge to Israel

In the regional arena, Iran continues to consolidate its political, military, and economic influence in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. Iran reinforces its influence through the spread of long-range weapons – missiles and attack UAVs; and the establishment of local militias that it controls and develops with weapons, training, and finance. Iran’s entrenchment, in terms of both presence and influence in the region, is a long-term strategic project, and although it is currently languishing given Iran’s severe economic and budgetary crisis due to American sanctions, Iran has found resources to invest in the project. Israel must continue to try to obstruct Iranian entrenchment in the northern arena and disrupt its subversive regional activity as part of the ongoing campaign between wars (CBW), while improving capabilities and avoiding signs of weakening in its struggle against Iranian influence.

In the wake of Israeli attacks, Tehran has an open account with Israel. The blows Iran suffered over the past year that were attributed to Israel – the targeted killing of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, damage to its advanced centrifuge assembly facility, damage to the electrical system at the Natanz site that destroyed about half the centrifuges, and the attacks in Syria – have not so far seen a “fitting” Iranian response (one that won’t deteriorate into total hostilities), but it will come when conditions permit.

The Northern Arena[Syria and Lebanon]
The potential threat in the northern arena is reinforced by the weakness and even imminent collapse of Lebanon and the ongoing division of the Syrian state, allowing Iran to increase its involvement and build a “war machine” that is more and more based on the ability to launch precision attacks deep into Israeli territory.

Although there is mutual deterrence between Israel and Hezbollah, there is greater potential for deterioration because of actions that could create a dynamic of escalation.

Lebanon Collapsing
Lebanon is collapsing as a result of the political crisis and power struggles between sectoral elites; the impotence of the political system, which has failed to deal with the profound economic, social, and political crisis and renders the government unable to meet the needs of its population; the healthcare crisis due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which has so far claimed the lives of some 8,000 Lebanese; and the ongoing effects of the explosion at the Beirut Port (August 2020), which left some 200,000 people homeless. International willingness to assist Lebanon is conditioned on the formation of a functioning and less corrupt government, able to promote political-governmental and economic reforms. Among the general public there is evidence of despair and an increased desire to emigrate, with rising rates of violence and signs of anarchy.

In spite of its difficult situation and the growing internal criticism directed against it, Hezbollah retains its power and continues to reinforce its grip on the Lebanese system, while building the precision attack capabilities that make it a real and severe threat to Israel and the spearhead of the anti-Israel Shiite axis. Notwithstanding Hezbollah’s belligerent declarations during Operation Guardian of the Walls and the freedom given to Palestinian factions to fire rockets into Israel from Lebanese territory, Hezbollah is restrained, although it continues to challenge Israel and test the rules of the game. The IDF must prepare for scenarios of escalation, including clashes with Hezbollah that could develop into war in the north.

Israel’s government must determine the “when and how” to deal with the precision missile project. In addition, Israel must promote an international and regional effort to prevent Lebanon’s slide into anarchy or civil war, or a seizure of power by Hezbollah.

Divided Syria
Syria is divided, mired in a deep economic crisis and far from reconstruction or a settlement and political reforms. The crisis heightens the regime’s dependence on Russia and Iran.

Iran’s entrenchment in Syria is multi-dimensional, dynamic, and currently focused on the effort to recruit local manpower, to move the center of gravity to the east and north (Aleppo), and to reinforce civilian entrenchment through investment in real estate and educational and cultural institutions. Alongside the dominance of Hezbollah forces and militias under Iranian influence on the Golan Heights, southern Syria is a no man’s land subject to bloody fighting between local groups, rebels, Hezbollah, Iranian proxies, regime supporters, and Russian forces. Turkey, for its part, continues to strengthen its presence in territories it has captured in northern Syria and to clash with the Kurds.

Russia and Iran compete for influence in Syria, but are dependent on each other. For both of them, Assad’s rule guarantees their military and economic assets in Syria, and neither envisions an alternative to his regime. The Biden administration is still formulating its strategy toward Syria and maintaining an American military presence, which from Israel’s viewpoint is an essential barrier to stop Iran from taking control of the Iraqi-Syrian border area and extending the land bridge from Tehran to Damascus and Beirut.

Israel must recognize that Syria will remain divided, and that as long as Assad is the sovereign, there is no possibility of driving Iran and its proxies out of the country. In order to limit the Iranian threat from Syria while continuing the CBW, Israel must adopt a proactive policy of pushing Iran and its proxies out of Syria – by means of international and regional cooperation and by forming and supporting a network of possible allies within the country.