National stockpileThe National Stockpile: Modernizing for a Dynamic Response

By Diane DiEuliis & Patrick Terrell

Published 26 August 2021

Response to a spreading illness in many ways is not rocket science:  treat the sick, protect the vulnerable, and stop the spread – mainly accomplished via the tools and products of biotechnology.  Many are now asking, what could we have done better in the pandemic response? 

Many have acknowledged that the COVID19 pandemic was not a failure of our imagination – we’ve been preparing for such an event for decades by building biotechnologies for biosurveillance and medicines, conducting exercises, and stockpiling of medical supplies. Response to a spreading illness in many ways is not rocket science:  treat the sick, protect the vulnerable, and stop the spread – mainly accomplished via the tools and products of biotechnology.  Many are now asking, what could we have done better in the pandemic response?  We would argue that our biotechnology tools and platforms for responding have not kept up with scientific advances – with the fortunate exception of the rapid development and delivery of a truly novel type of vaccine. That opportune success notwithstanding, much of our approach to preparing for a pandemic is outdated. The medical supply system has been optimized to reduce inventories and receive materials on a near ‘Just-in-Time’ basis. This has left very little surge capacity to respond to a global crisis, other than stockpiles of government owned materials which are not intended to cover all potential pandemics.  

Earlier this year we described the “Fourth Industrial Revolution” in biotechnology, hallmarked by global competition between the US and China.  In our recommendations for how to successfully grow the US bioeconomy, we recommended a focus on reshoring US production capacity, creating new state and local businesses focused on biomanufacturing, and expanding the use of bio-based products.[i]  “Lessons learned” assessments applied in the post-COVID environment now offer a timely opportunity to apply these recommendations as we remedy U.S. biotechnology response capabilities; not only can we greatly improve our capability to respond in the future, but at the same time, we can prototype the modernization of our bio-industrial base.

Perhaps the best example of a static, antiquated response capability that typifies a lack of biotechnology modernization is the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)[ii]. The word “stockpile” itself brings to mind cavernous warehouses in inconspicuous locations around the country, full of boxes, cartons, and pallets of emergency medical goods, slowly and inexorably approaching their expiration dates. Prior to COVID19, most Americans did not know of the existence of this strategic resource that the US had been investing in since its creation 1998.