ARGUMENT: RISK OF NUCLEAR WARWhy the War in Ukraine Poses a Greater Nuclear Risk than the Cuban Missile Crisis

There has been a considerable debate of the risk of nuclear escalation growing from the current Russian war in Ukraine. Some dismiss the concern about a possible Russian first use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine, arguing that rather than allowing Putin’s nuclear saber rattling to intimidate the Western alliance and constrain the West’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the United States and NATO should remind Russia of American and NATO capabilities to respond with overwhelming force to any Russian nuclear first use in Ukraine or elsewhere in Europe.

Lawrence Korb and Stephen Cimbala write in Just Security that “[d]ismissing Putin’s nuclear saber rattling as a ploy to manipulate NATO and world opinion, however, would be a mistake. The likelihood of a deliberate or miscalculated escalation to nuclear first use is now as great, or greater, than it was during the fateful Cuban missile crisis of 1962.”

This is so for a number of reasons:

·  First, the initial five weeks of fighting left Russian military leadership short of their objective of taking Kiyv and toppling the Zelenskyy government. “If Ukrainian military performance relative to Russia’s continues to improve, and Russia’s situation deteriorates even further, Moscow out of desperation might consider using chemical, biological, or even nuclear weapons.”

·  Second, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s unsuccessful scheme to deploy Russian nuclear missiles to Cuba was eventually the source of his undoing two years later as leader of the USSR. Khrushchev was accountable to a collective communist party leadership (the Politburo) that eventually denounced him for “adventurism.” “The absence of any obviously restraining force on Putin within the Russian domestic policy-making process should be of great concern to NATO in its approach to the control of escalation.”

·  Third, the nature of communications technology and its influence on public and media opinion is vastly different now compared to the situation in 1962. Kennedy and his advisers had the luxury of secrecy and public ignorance allowing them to explore several alternative responses to the Russian missiles in Cuba. “It would be inconceivable today, with the global cornucopia of news sources and social media platforms, for any looming nuclear crisis to be concealed from public view for days or weeks… Leaders will be hard pressed to explain the nuances of deterrence or nuclear crisis management amid the clamor of inevitable misinformation and confusion.”

·  Fourth, the Cuban missile crisis took place in a world order dominated by two nuclear superpowers, and their ideological differences notwithstanding, both Washington and Moscow had a shared interest in maintaining a bipolar international system that suppressed disruptive initiatives by other actors. “Putin objects fundamentally to the rules-based international order supported by the United States and NATO.” Moreover, the next “nuclear crises will take place within an international system of (at least) three nuclear superpowers, adding complexity and indeterminacy to an already delicate process of nuclear crisis management.”

·  Fifth, leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union in 1962 came from the World War II generation. They understood personally and viscerally the costs of war and its devasting consequences for society. “Today’s leaders in NATO and Russia, in contrast to their counterparts from the World War II era, have grown up in much more favorable political and economic times.”

·  Sixth, nuclear deterrence depends upon a rational model of decision-making, but states in conflict may bring different rationalities to the table. “Two states that are ‘rational’ within their own frames of reference may nevertheless find that their policies and strategies collide with unexpectedly disastrous results.”

·  Seventh, nuclear weapons do not easily lend themselves to piecemeal or disaggregated use for messaging purposes. But:

Russian military doctrine suggests that “escalation to win” is a strategy that is more likely to be adopted once the decision to cross the nuclear threshold has been taken. Professors and pundits can conjure Russians who think about the actual use of nuclear weapons in combat, as opposed to their use for deterrence, as signaling devices or bargaining chips. But it would be dangerous for NATO to carry that assumption into a crisis management scenario with Russia.