Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State Networks on Facebook
A qualitative cross-platform analysis showed the most active, networked, and multilingual ecosystem of support for al-Shabaab and the Islamic State existed on Facebook, where profiles and pages classified as “media outlets” were sharing terrorist content openly, and eschewing private groups and profiles. The content that ISD researchers observed through the networks is often linked to “media” and “media personality” pages in Somali, Kiswahili and Arabic, and not only violates the platform’s community guidelines, but also points to language moderation blind spots that have been previously documented by journalists as well as whistleblowers.
These language gaps continue to fluster Facebook moderation5 , despite the company’s increased investment in moderation6 . In October of last year, internal Facebook documents released to the public for the first time indicated the platform lagged behind in its ability to effectively moderate languages in “at-risk” countries such as Iraq, Ethiopia, India and Pakistan7 . In Afghanistan for instance, Facebook researchers claimed finding accurate translations of Pashto and Dari undercut effective moderation. Arabic, and its regional variations and dialects, was of similar concern to Facebook. ISD research has previously shown just how Arabic conspiracies8 and terror content9 flummoxed moderators10 and moderation efforts. Facebook has attempted to step moderation of Arabic, based on both the revelations and indications from the internal documents released to improve those efforts in a number of languages.
Yet, even with the increased scrutiny on the platform’s moderation efforts in languages outside of English11, what ISD research indicates is that language moderation gaps not only play into the hands of governments conducting human rights abuses12 or spreading hate speech13, but are similarly resulting in brazenly open displays of support for terror groups such as al-Shabaab and the Islamic State (Image 3). Emblematic of this issue, researchers found a Somali-language “media outlet” shared four official al-Shabaab videos through its public page during a three-week stretch of October 2021, collectively garnering 53,300 views, and 17,800 shares. These videos carried al-Shabaab’s official media outlet branding and were in no shape or form disguised to get past moderators, and yet managed to stay on the platform for months. This report is an attempt to understand gaps in moderation and the tactics to evade moderation dynamic, and the networks of terror supporting profiles and pages that sit at the core of the issue.
Furthermore, ISD investigation revealed a highly coordinated online propaganda machinery that relies on the surface web as much as it does on a network of Somali, Kiswahili and Arabic language Facebook profiles and pages to spread key narratives such as al-Shabaab and the Islamic State being an anti-imperial and anti-colonial force protecting the interests of Muslims in Somalia, Ethiopia, Uganda, and notably, Kenya. Central to these narratives is a foundational set of tropes that relies on calling out the illegitimacy of the governments currently in power across East Africa, while championing taking up arms to fight their “democracy” and their “elections”. It is also important to note that xenophobia toward Somali communities14 in Kenya has long been rife,15 leading to the demonization, securitization, and disenfranchisement of Somali refugees and Somali-Kenyan Muslims.
While some of the research16 into Kenya and al-Shabaab and Islamic State support online has rightly focused on Kiswahili and English-speaking networks, understanding the reach and key narratives of Somali, Kiswahili and Arabic language networks, creates a more complete picture of al-Shabaab and Islamic State propaganda and recruitment efforts to date. It is also important to note that xenophobia toward Somali communities17 in Kenya has long been rife18, leading to the demonization, securitization, and disenfranchisement of Somali refugees and Somali-Kenyan Muslims.
Well aware of these issues, ISD researchers note while Somali-language profiles and pages were the most visible bases of al-Shabaab support, Kiswahili and Arabic language accounts also played important roles as central promoters of both al-Shabaab and Islamic State narratives and content. Many of the high profile accounts supportive of the Islamic State in East Africa found during this investigation used Kiswahili to promote official narratives from the group. The largest public group of supporters of both al-Shabaab and the Islamic State in East Africa was a Swahili-language group dedicated to a noted extremist preacher from Mombasa, Kenya19. The group used a photo of Sheik Aboud Rogo, who helped al-Shabaab fund operations and recruit was killed in 2012, and functioned as a central locus point for sharing al-Shabaab and the Islamic State propaganda.
The findings from the investigation point to key gaps in understanding al-Shabaab and Islamic State networks on Facebook and clear moderation gaps on the platform. These gaps play directly into the hands of al-Shabaab and Islamic State supporters and outlets. The most clear example of this was following the attack on the DusitD2 Complex in Nairobi in January 2019, which resulted in 22 people and 5 attackers being killed. A Kenyan government investigation into its planning revealed it was coordinated on Facebook through an account that was “undetected for six months until after the attack.”20 This investigation has also highlighted the need for Kenyan authorities, both at the national and local levels, as well as civil society, to revisit their understanding of the narratives used to promote, and potentially radicalize, Kenyans into the ranks of al-Shabaab and the Islamic State. Ultimately, al-Shabaab and Islamic State supporters are capitalizing on ineffective moderation in East African languages to build out stronger and more resilient networks to polarize audiences and pollute the information landscape with extremist disinformation.
The findings presented are meant to provide a more holistic understanding of the al-Shabaab and Islamic State presence on the open web and popular social media platforms such as Facebook. The report highlights the existence of a continually-evolving ecosystem of al-Shabaab and Islamic State supporters promoting multilingual narratives focused on the African continent as well as its governments and civil society. These ecosystems seek to sow distrust in democracy and democratic practices by honing in on government-linked rights abuses, presenting both al-Shabaab and the Islamic State as popular alternatives to the status quo.
As another contentious election season looms in Kenya, and a history of widespread election violence hangs over the upcoming poll. The most active al-Shabaab and Islamic State supportive profiles analyzed for this report were found to be sowing discord ahead of the election by calling for violence and the establishment of an East African caliphate.
These dual, and dueling, ecosystems of extremism are alive and well, adapting to an online environment where there seems to be less effective moderation than in other contexts, and ultimately, exploiting the open web and Facebook for its ability to spread old and new content to regional audiences. While extremists are taking advantage of this fractured and polarized landscape, ‘gaming’ the system to increase the chances of radicalization and recruitment online, they are also unencumbered by the lack of effective moderation in the languages of the region.
1. Caleb Weiss and Andrew Tobin. “Shabaab kills dozens in twin suicide bombings targeting Somalia’s election process.” Long War Journal. March 24, 2022. Link: https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2022/03/shabaab-kills-dozens-in-twin-suicide-bombings-targeting-somalias-election-process.php
2. Jason Warner, Ryan O’Farrell, Heni Nsaibia, and Ryan Cummings. “Outlasting the caliphate: the evolution of the Islamic State threat in Africa.” CTC Sentinel. Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. November/December 2020. Volume 13, Issue 11. Link: https://ctc.usma.edu/outlasting-thecaliphate-the-evolution-of-the-islami…
3. Researchers flagged a set of 150 Somali, Kiswahili and Arabic Facebook accounts supportive of al-Shabaab and the Islamic State in Africa from July through August 2020, which were taken down by the platform once flagged as part of the process. Researchers continued monitoring the platform following the takedowns to understand extremist resilience to moderation and found that these networks would often reconstitute themselves, adapting and learning to take down measures. Some of those measures will be documented in this report, and have been previously noted in ISD research on Islamic State accounts on Facebook.
4. ISD found two accounts on Twitter that were linked to the “news” ecosystems of al-Shabaab, and one channel on YouTube. The accounts were flagged by researchers during the research period. The YouTube channel was taken down for violating platform guidelines. The Twitter accounts are still active, and have been flagged again. ISD is refraining from naming the sites in order not to send more traffic into the sites.
5. Deepa Seetharaman, Jeff Horwitz and Justin Scheck. “Facebook says AI will clean up the platform. Its own engineers have doubts.” Wall Street Journal. October 17, 2021. Link: https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-ai-enforce-rules-engineers-doubtful-artificial-intelligence-11634338184?mod=article_inline
6. Meta. “Our progress addressing challenges and innovating responsibly.” The company stated it had 40,000 employees working on safety and security, and have spent $13 billion in teams and technology since 2016. September 21, 2021. Link: https://about.fb.com/news/2021/09/our-progressaddressing-challenges-and-innovating-responsibly/
7. Rishi Iyenger. “Facebook has language blind spots around the world that allow hate speech to flourish.” CNN. October 26, 2021. Link: https://edition.cnn.com/2021/10/26/tech/facebook-papers-language-hate-speech-international/index.html
8. Matt Burgess. “A new type of Bill Gates conspiracy theory is going viral on Facebook.” Wired. September 4, 2021. Link: https://www.wired.co.uk/article/bill-gates-conspiracy-theory-arabic
9. Moustafa Ayad. “Facebook and YouTube Are Failing to Detect Terrorist Content in Arabic.” VICE. August 9, 2019. Link: https://www.vice.com/en/article/59nmyd/facebook-and-youtube-are-failing-to-detect-terrorist-content-in-arabic
10. Mark Scott. “Islamic State evolves ’emoji’ tactics to peddle propaganda online.” Politico. February 10, 2022. Link: https://www.politico.eu/article/islamic-state-disinformation-social-media/
11. Tom Simonite. “Facebook is everywhere; its moderation is nowhere close.” Wired. October 25, 2021. Link: https://www.wired.com/story/facebooks-global-reach-exceeds-linguistic-grasp/
12. Paul Mozer. “A genocide incited on Facebook, with posts from Myannmar’s military.” New York Times. October 18, 2018. Link: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/technology/myanmar-facebook-genocide.html
13. Billy Perrigo. “Facebook’s ties to India’s ruling party complicates its fight against hate speech.” Time. August 27, 2020. Link: https://time.com/5883993/india-facebook-hate-speech-bjp/
14. Laura Freeman. “They’re all terrorists: the securitastion of asylum in Kenya.” Extremisms in Africa, Vol. 2 (pp.92-123).Tracey McDonald Publishers. June, 2019. Link: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334466321_They%27re_All_Terrorists_The_Securitisation_of_Asylum_in_Kenya
15. Catherine Wambua-Soi. “Rising xenophobia against Somalis in Kenya.” Al-Jazeera English. November 20, 2012. Link: https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2012/11/20/rising-xenophobia-against-somalis-in-kenya
16. Zahed Amanullah and Anisa Harrasy. “Between two extremes: responding to Islamist messagning online in Kenya during the 2017 election.” Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD). Feburary, 2018. Link: https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Between-Two-Extremes-Feb-2018-ISD.pdf
17. Laura Freeman. “They’re all terrorists: the securitastion of asylum in Kenya.” Extremisms in Africa, Vol. 2 (pp.92-123).Tracey McDonald Publishers. June, 2019. Link: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334466321_They%27re_All_Terrorists_The_Securitisation_of_Asylum_in_Kenya
18. Catherine Wambua-Soi. “Rising xenophobia against Somalis in Kenya.” Al-Jazeera English. November 20, 2012. Link: https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2012/11/20/rising-xenophobia-against-somalis-in-kenya
19. United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions list. July 25, 2012. Link: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/751/materials/summaries/ individual/aboud-rogo-mohammed BBC. “‘Al-Shabaab supporter’ Aboud Rogo Mohammed killed in Kenya.” August 27, 2012. Link: https://www.bbc.com/ news/world-africa-19390888 The killing of Rogo, who was revered in some pockets across the coast of Kenya, led to protests and a formal inquiry into his death.
20. Cyrus Ombati. “Dusit attack was planned on Facebook, probe shows.” The Star. January 14, 2021. Link: https://www.the-star.co.ke/counties/ nairobi/2021-01-14-dusit-attack-was-planned-on-facebook-probe-shows/“A probe into the January 15, 2019 incident shows the attackers opened a Facebook account and used it in their planning to the last day of the raid.”
