China Faces Major Challenges in Achieving Goal of Global Technological Pre-Eminence

Indicators of the Conditions for a
Science and Technology Great Power
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Expenditure on research and development as a percentage of GDP (%)

2017
Japan – 3.1
Germany – 2.9
U.S.– 2.7
China – 2.1
China’s objectives
2035 — 3.5
2050 — 4

Researchers per 100 citizens (%)

2017
Japan – 0.996*
Germany – 0.919*
U.S.– 0.914**
China – 0.21*
China’s objectives
2035 – 0.4
2050 – 0.5

Internationally influential papers published (%)

2017
Japan – 3.32*
Germany – 5.81*
U.S.– 25.53*
China – 14.01*
China’s objectives
2035 – 20
2050 – 25

Volume of patent applications as a percentage of GDP (US$ billion)

2017
Japan – 8.9
Germany – 4.6
U.S.– 2.9
China – 2.1
China’s objectives
2035 – 4
2050 – 8

Intellectual property revenues as a percentage of trade (%)

2017
Japan – 2.1
Germany – 1.2
U.S.– 5.0
China – 0.1
China’s objectives
2035 – X
2050 – Y

Number of Nobel Prizes awarded in three natural sciences (cumulative totals)

2017
Japan – 14
Germany – 61
U.S.– 172
China – 2
China’s objectives
2035 – ≥10
2050 – ≥20

* Data for 2016; ** data for 2015.
Source: Table compiled by the author based on the table in Zhang Zhiqiang, Tian Qianfei and Chen Yunwei 2018, ‘Research on main scientific and technological indicators of science and technology power’, Bulletin of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, 33(10): 1060.
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Rising military tensions with the US have also spurred a sense of crisis in Xi’s administration. With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the possibility of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan became widely discussed in Western countries.

To realize a ‘world-class military’ on a par with that of the US by the middle of the century, Xi’s administration is accelerating the transfer of cutting-edge technology to the military sector to transform equipment, weapons, organizational culture and capabilities, and generate a ‘new military revolution’. Senior People’s Liberation Army officials recognize that harnessing emerging technologies is key to reversing the military inferiority of the PLA vis-à-vis the US military. However, achieving this through the use of science and technology is becoming tougher in the environment of tighter trade and investment restrictions by Western countries.

Xi’s government has repeatedly used the term ‘self-reliance and self-strengthening’ (自立自) in the context of China becoming a science and technology great power. This means developing core technologies that are key in global value chains through a ‘whole nation system’ (举国体制).

Around 2015, the government began using the slogan ‘Made in China 2025’ to increase technological self-sufficiency and it adopted the ‘military–civil fusion’ development strategy to promote the military use of advanced technology developed in the civil sector. However, this does not appear to be progressing as it hoped. For example, China aimed to be 70% self-sufficient in semiconductor manufacturing by 2025, but an estimate puts current domestic production at less than 20%.

China will continue its efforts to improve its science and technology capabilities and this will have an impact on its international relations. While upgrading its industrial structures, China has strengthened regulations governing technology exports to protect its national security interests. Xi has said he wants to increase China’s role in global supply chains and to strengthen its economy against deliberate supply chain interruptions. In the past, China has applied pressure on other countries by tightening import and export controls on mineral resources, agricultural products and cultural projects. Technology exports and investment are likely to be added to this list. That could increase China’s influence over developing countries keen for its technology and investment.

China’s attempt to become fully self-sufficient in core technologies will create its own dilemma. To develop its science and technology capabilities, China needs to exchange technology and personnel with advanced countries. Such countries will likely not welcome this exchange as long as Xi’s administration continues to pursue its military–civil fusion strategy.

Concerned Western countries have already restricted the access of researchers suspected of having ties with the PLA and suspended joint research projects.

The more the Chinese leadership promotes self-sufficiency, the harder it will be to maintain an open-door policy—and to realize its dream of becoming a science and technology great power.

Masaaki Yatsuzuka is a senior fellow at Japan’s National Institute for Defense Studies and a visiting fellow at ASPI.This article is published courtesy of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI).