What Jan. 6 Revealed About QAnon and Militias

The militia movement gained momentum from its inception around 1992 (corresponding with the Ruby Ridge standoff) until the late 1990s. However, after Timothy McVeigh bombed the Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995—an act that had been reportedly inspired by pro-militia literature and conspiracy theories—the movement’s activity declined significantly. Another wave of anti-government groups in the militia movement emerged after the election of President Barack Obama in 2008. Finally, the militia movement rose in a third wave after the election of President Trump. With each of these resurgences, the dominant ideology of the militia movement has shifted. Most notably, the focus pivoted away from targeting the federal government after Trump—whose candidacy the militia movement had supported—won the election. Instead, focus moved toward “other perceived enemies, such as Antifa” and opposing “state-level gun control measures, state-level pandemic-related restrictions, and Black Lives Matter protests.”

Recently, dominant ideologies within the militia movement have shifted yet again, this time finding a rallying point around QAnon conspiracy theories.Throughout 2020, as members of extremist groups coalesced in what researchers have termed a “militia-sphere,” their messaging latched on to QAnon conspiracy theories.

The confluence is perhaps not surprising, as both ideologies share three common ideological foundations.

·  The first is a deep belief in government corruption. For the militia movement, the corruption is located in the American federal government, particularly among members of the Democratic Party. 

·  The second ideological pillar QAnon and the militia movement share is known as apocalypticism—the belief that the end of society as we know it is imminent. In the militia movement, this apocalyptic theme presents itself through predictions of a future conflict between members of the movement and the federal government (either a second revolutionary war or a second civil war).

·  The third shared ideological pillar is the notion of a responsibility to defend. QAnon, in imagining nefarious actors in almost all aspects of public life, built a community of “people who are determined to think you’re in danger, and that it’s their job to protect you, while the only real danger is their protection.” Although notably applied to children, as seen in QAnon adherents’ consistent “save the children” messaging, QAnon’s responsibility to defend also included Donald Trump and his presidency following the 2020 election. QAnon conspiracy theories about the 2020 election imbued in Q’s followers that “Trump had no chance of losing as long as the election was conducted fairly and legally,” whereas a Biden victory “meant the election was stolen and illegal.”

Kokotakis concludes:

These shared ideological foundations create common ground for otherwise unrelated groups, at least as they pertain to the 18 subjects of the study. The 2020 election and its aftermath revealed a bond between QAnon and the militia movement that is likely to persist because of the Biden administration’s perceived illegitimacy and threat to liberty. QAnon election fraud conspiracy theories may also draw in more extreme groups such as the “boogaloo bois, whose growing presence in the militia-sphere may represent the emergence of “a faction that is particularly receptive to opportunities to conduct violent actions under the umbrella philosophy of accelerationism.” Researchers also fear that QAnon conspiracy theories may attract individuals from the mainstream to the militia-sphere, particularly when they are banned from social media for QAnon-related posts. Such individuals are then more likely to be exploited by organizations in the militia movement and other far-right groups on alternative social media platforms.

The confluence of ideas presents opportunities for reciprocal radicalization. There is also a risk of broader ideological convergence, which “confuses counterterrorism defenses, eroding predictability and challenging law enforcement and intelligence categorizations,” making it harder for authorities to “adequately prepare countermeasures, let alone warn and defend potentially targeted communities and sites.” 

Now, the 2024 presidential election is approaching, again conjuring images of Q flags waving alongside fatigues-clad extremists in stack formation. In the face of these far-right convergences, was Jan. 6 only a snapshot?