Domestic terrorism, critical infrastructure, nuclear plants, nuclear security regime

Domestic Violent Extremists’ Threat to U.S. Nuclear Facilities

The emboldening of non-state actors through the proliferation of accelerationist ideologies among domestic violent extremist (DVE) groups pose a threat, not only to national security, but to the nuclear facilities that make up part of the nation’s critical infrastructure. Compounding these risks are intersections of insider threats and accelerationism that demonstrate the shortcomings in the protective frameworks designed by the traditional national and nuclear security decision-makers in the United States. Traditional assumptions informing security priorities are no longer sufficient to address emerging threats and evolving operational environments, because they fail to adapt to new actors and shifting environments.

Here are excerpts from the study:

Executive Summary
The events of the 21st century have required a reimagining of how nuclear security practitioners perceive threats in the United States. With the rise of terrorism concerns over the last two decades came the increase in the security risk posed by non-state actors to nuclear facilities. Insider threats and non-state actors are the most persistent concerns facing nuclear security practitioners – but the notion of who or what constitutes a threat is so deeply rooted in antiquated understandings of an adversary, that the U.S. nuclear security regime as a whole has struggled to address the risks posed by domestic violent extremists.

Illustrating the risk posed by DVE actors and the vulnerabilities that can be exploited by insiders is a crucial step towards redefining ‘threat’ and understanding why the status quo is insufficient in the current threat landscape. The January 6, 2021, insurrection at the U.S. Capitol revealed the flaws in a system designed to weed out unsuitable candidates for sensitive work protecting nuclear materials, weapons, facilities, technology, and personnel. Understanding the limitations of the current system and the efforts underway by federal agencies to mitigate the DVE threat to nuclear and national security is a critical first step in creating a more sustainable and resilient national nuclear security regime.

Introduction
In the aftermath of 9/11, the bulk of U.S. national security efforts – and subsequent nuclear security initiatives – were oriented towards protecting the country against a jihadist foreign terrorist organization and their efforts to cultivate homegrown violent extremists in the United States. These acts of terror were pivotal for the resurgence of nuclear security. The international community banded together against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction with the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 – acknowledging the devastating potential of non-state actors with malign intent acquiring nuclear, radiological, chemical, or biological weapons – supported further by UNSCR 1373 and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.¹ Initiatives like the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the G7 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (Global Partnership) aimed to strengthen global norms to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism through multilateral activities and assistance. ²

In the United States, this commitment to the physical protection of nuclear materials, weapons, facilities, technology, and personnel was no less salient – and the U.S. has proven itself a leader in nuclear security in light of the vulnerabilities it has faced at home. This led to nuclear security experts, national security advocates, and policymakers calling for stronger leadership and initiative to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism as not only a national security issue, but a regional and international security priority – and to place focus on the threat posed by insiders, rather than the traditional purview of external actors who could be deterred by ‘guns, guards, and gates.’³ Through the Nuclear Security Summits, 52 countries and international organizations produced over 1000 new nuclear security commitments over six years – resulting in the Amendment to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials entering into force, the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s International Conference on Nuclear Security series, and the Fissile Material Working Group (now the International Nuclear Security Forum) for civil society advocacy and participation in nuclear security work. ⁴ However, attention on nuclear security has waned. And today’s shifting threat landscape challenges the nuclear security concepts of the early 2000s.

Since 9/11, the nature of the threats facing the U.S. has evolved. Rather than focusing on international extremists with foreign ideological motives, federal agencies and law enforcement have begun to recognize the prevalence of domestic violent extremist threats to national security and critical infrastructure, including the nuclear sector. In 2021, U.S. Attorney General Merrick B. Garland and Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro N. Mayorkas identified the greatest domestic threat facing the United States as “racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists,” specifically highlighting white supremacists.⁵ While anti-government, white supremacy and neo-Nazi ideologues have long existed within the fabric of U.S. society, before 9/11, many of these extremist groups or individuals were mostly rejected or were confined to the fringes of the social order. Online extremism and the January 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol have raised these groups’ visibility, while social media tools have helped them to proliferate their ideology and coordinate effective messaging and tactics. This paper will examine how the events of January 6, 2021, have shifted understanding of U.S. national security threats, explore strands of DVE ideology that specifically target the nuclear sector, and present case studies of DVE actors relevant to nuclear security before laying out U.S. government approaches and challenges in addressing this type of threat. We conclude by positing that the security community has not sufficiently redefined threat and present case studies of DVE actors.

The Domestic Violent Extremist Threat
POST-JANUARY 6^THAND THE CURRENT DVE THREAT
Many scholars have pointed to January 6^th as the catalyst for renewed attention on insider threats and domestic violent extremism as national security priorities.⁶ Both the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security have since recognized the evolving threat landscape since 9/11 and national and nuclear security priorities have slowly shifted from its long-time focus on international jihadists and foreign radicalization, towards domestic terrorists. In the aftermath of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, the issue of “insider threats” was at the forefront of U.S. counterterrorism efforts, but failed to evolve in the post-9/11 environment.⁷ In the weeks following the siege, a new picture of the threat landscape emerged as the Department of Justice and FBI launched a nationwide effort to investigate the participants of January 6^th. The investigation revealed that most participants were adherents of extremist ideology, many of whom were radicalized online and mobilized to take part in the insurrection. Some also adhered to a DVE ideology of concern for nuclear security, accelerationism, which is described in more detail later in this paper.

What is concerning, however, is the original failure of the FBI to anticipate the Capitol attack in the first place. Before the end of the 2020 presidential race, a team of intelligence analysts tried to game out the worst potential outcomes of a disputed election. But they never thought of the one that transpired: a violent mob mobilizing to overturn the election in support of Donald Trump.⁸ Adam Goldman and Alan Feur write that the FBI was “[a]pparently blinded by a narrow focus on ‘lone wolf’ offenders and a misguided belief that the threat from the far left was as great as that from the far right,” thus, officials at the bureau did not anticipate or adequately prepare for the attack.⁹ This confirmation bias also failed to account for actors such as militia groups or white supremacists, who took a leading role in the Capitol siege.

In May 2021, Attorney General Merrick B. Garland and Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro N. Mayorkas identified the greatest domestic threat facing the United States as “racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists,” specifically, white supremacists.¹⁰ White supremacist extremists pose the primary threat among all domestic violent extremists. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) provided data showing that white supremacists were responsible for 51 out of 169 domestic terrorist attacks and plots from 2010 through 2021, the highest number among domestic terrorist ideologies.¹¹ In October 2022, the FBI and DHS issued a report titled “Strategic Intelligence Assessment and Data on Domestic Terrorism,” which put forth the most significant threat facing the U.S. as being posed by “lone offenders and small groups of individuals who commit acts of violence motivated by a range of ideological beliefs and/or personal grievances.”¹² The report also contended that of these actors, “domestic violent extremists represent one of the most persistent threats to the United States today.”¹³

The January 6^th Capitol riot compelled the Biden Administration to prioritize the issue of domestic extremism. FBI Director Chris Wray condemned the January insurrection as “domestic terrorism” and described in stark terms the threat domestic violent extremists posed to the United States.¹⁴ While not every individual involved in the attack was part of a militia or right-wing group, many shared common beliefs.

DVE, Accelerationism, and Critical Nuclear Infrastructure
Domestic violent extremism (DVE) is an all-encompassing category that includes a variety of ideologies, including anti-government extremists, anarchists, anti-abortion extremists, white supremacists, involuntary celibates, ecoterrorists, and a smattering of other assorted extremists from across the political spectrum.¹⁵ While DVE represents a range of threats, the interest in nuclear terrorism by accelerationist white nationalist groups represents a particular security concern for the nuclear policy community.

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
One commonly shared feature of DVE adherents is the focus on attacking critical infrastructure – including nuclear power plants. Attacks on U.S. energy infrastructure are increasing.¹⁶ Recent incidents on infrastructure include six “intrusion events” at Florida substations in September 2022; six attacks on substations in the US Northwest in November and December of 2022; four substations vandalized in Washington State cutting power to 14,000 on Christmas Day, 2022; and a December 2022 North Carolina “targeted attack that left thousands without power.”¹⁷ Attackers often seek to attack regional power substations in order to cause economic distress and civil unrest. Leftist, anti-statist, accelerationist groups have also emerged on Telegram, to espouse their views that the U.S. electrical grid must be systematically attacked and dismantled. Telegram has attempted to remove much of the content but has been ineffective at regulating its content to filter extremist messaging.¹⁸ As laid out in detail in the Case Studies section below, white supremacists Brandon Russell and Sarah Clendaniel were arrested in February 2023, on federal charges of plotting to shoot up a ring of subpower stations in Baltimore. The intent was to “destroy” Baltimore, a majority Black city.¹⁹ Greg Harman writes that the “arrest reflects a sustained mobilization of homegrown neo-Nazi networks, whose members are seeking to disrupt the nation’s power supply in hopes of ushering in economic collapse and race war.”²⁰

DVE and insider threats thus represent a particular area of concern for nuclear security, as evidenced by the Institute of Nuclear Management’s (INMM) exploration of the intersection of homegrown violent extremism and the security of nuclear facilities at its 63^rd Annual Meeting. Indeed, prior to targeting the Baltimore grid, Brandon Russell had expressed interest in taking out a Florida nuclear plant.²¹ Russell’s case is not an outlier. Other domestic violent extremist actors have illustrated the vulnerabilities in how security practitioners identify threats to nuclear security across the ideological spectrum – from other far-right actors like Matthew Gebert and Ashli Babbitt in recent years, to the jihadist radicalization of Sharif Mobley following the 9/11 attacks. The Case Studies section of this paper presents more detail on each of these cases.

ACCELERATIONISM
Accelerationist ideology, which holds that the modern, Western democratic state is so mired in corruption and ineptitude that true patriots should instigate a violent insurrection, ultimately allowing a new, white-dominated order to emerge, presents additional concerns for the nuclear security community as some groups advocate for the use of nuclear weapons to achieve the new order.²² Accelerationist dogma is often adopted by adherents who subscribe to an ‘alternative history,’ one that usually serves as a foil to the increasing racial diversity of American society. Accelerationists have created a historical narrative that utilizes stock footage, still images, and classical literature to assemble a romanticized image of an American past that valued whiteness, marriage, family values, and religiosity to claim that these values are in decline and to recruit membership from involuntary celibates (incels) and young, white men who wish to return to a manufactured past.²³

One accelerationist group that caught the attention of the nuclear community is the Atomwaffen Division (AWD). AWD was organized as a series of terror cells advocating for the use of nuclear weapons to yield the collapse of civilization. Unlike some other white power activists, accelerationists believe modernity “has reached such a level of degeneracy and corruption that it cannot be rescued through mass movements or other political means.²⁴” Many of the most violent manifestations of domestic violent extremism in the U.S. are encouraged by “mobilizing concepts.⁹”Mobilizing concepts are different from traditional ideological frameworks, which are rooted in more clearly articulated beliefs or theories about how political or economic systems should work (anarchism, communism, fascism, etc.). An understanding of these neo-fascist accelerationist groups as a fluid network with broader goals of social destruction, rather than individual units with distinct ideological perspectives helps understand the continued relevance of AWD and its mission even after its dormancy in 2017.²⁵ The effectiveness of these mobilizing concepts and the fluid nature of the ideological network can be seen in how AWD has inspired similar neo-fascist accelerationist groups such as The Base, which unlike AWD, has tried to veil its desire to spark a “nuclear civil war” behind claims that it is focused on maintaining a “survivalism and self-defense network” in an effort to recruit broader membership.²⁶

Another offshoot of the now-defunct neo-Nazi terror group Atomwaffen Division recently undertook a propaganda push to capitalize on the December 2022 power grid attack in Moore County, which resulted in widespread power outages affecting 40,000 customers.²⁷ The morning after the attack, neo-Nazi accelerationists on a private Telegram channel began to speculate about the involvement of the National Socialist Resistance Front (NSRF).²⁸ NSRF represents another rotating face of a network of neo-fascist groups that seek to use terror to promote their ideological goals of a new white-led order. In weeks leading up to the Moore County power grid attack, members of Uncle Ted’s Cabin channel distributed multiple terror manuals that encourage mass shootings and industrial sabotage.²⁹

While not all accelerationist or DVE groups have nuclear ambitions, examining AWD and its ability to influence other extremist groups provides a clearer understanding of the threat landscape. Insights into membership mobility can inform preventative actions by governments and emphasize the importance of examining the ties between accelerationist groups, to ensure that DVE groups remain unable to acquire nuclear materials, weapons, technology, or information that would advance their cause.

….

Conclusion
Assessing who or what is a threat in the U.S. nuclear space is increasingly challenging in a world filled with disinformation, shifting priorities, and evolving risk. What exacerbates these efforts to identify individuals who pose a risk to nuclear security is the flaw in the underlying framework for how the U.S. identifies insider threats at home.

For decades, the U.S. has constructed the notion of a ‘threat’ to fit the visual of someone who doesn’t present as an ‘American.²¹³’ This carefully constructed ‘American’ image is almost always representative of the lived experiences of white people in the U.S., with people who fail to present in this this way being subject to additional scrutiny – irrespective of the status of citizenship, criminal background, or threat to the U.S.²¹⁴ This ‘othering’ of non-white and otherwise ‘non-American’ presenting individuals reinforces problematic biases in national and nuclear security frameworks, creating an ‘us’ vs ‘them’ dynamic.²¹⁵ Given the historically homogenous nature of the nuclear security field dominated by white men in the United States, this has often placed women, people of color, and other historically marginalized groups under undue scrutiny by decision-makers in the field.

Insider threat assessments focus on personnel reliability programs and effective training, and existing literature is quick to acknowledge that there are flaws in frameworks designed to identify red flags, but what isn’t discussed is the underlying bias determining not only what constitutes a red flag at the organizational level, but also the individual biases that come into play when determining who or what is reported as ‘suspicious’ under these schemes.²¹⁶

Crucially, the national security field has been pushed to re-examine how ‘threat’ and by extension, ‘security’ are defined by the dominant culture, in contrast to the perception of ‘threat’ and ‘security’ faced by people of color, which are “deep-rooted in American society and culture.”²¹⁷ The discomfort that emerges from questioning traditional definitions of national security has received pushback, but new definitions are necessary, given “[the] way the U.S. defines threat does not adequately capture the challenges many people of color feel in America[,]” by largely failing to account for the security threats posed by individuals, governments, or crime.²¹⁸

This call for antiracism has echoed in the nuclear field as well. While important work has been done to draw connections between the importance of redefining national security and inequity in the nuclear policy space, one area that has received considerably less attention is the nuclear security field. The inequalities in the national security field caused by unilateral and biased understandings of who, or what is considered a ‘threat’ by the system writ large are directly connected to the notion of how ‘threat’ and ‘security’ are perceived by nuclear security implementers. These biases that originate in the overarching national security architecture are reflected in every aspect of U.S. nuclear security structure: from security clearance background checks, to personnel reliability programs, to how personnel security is implemented at a facility.

Because nuclear security culture and personnel reliability programs are driven by individual, organizational, and institutional structures, acknowledging that these structures can – intentionally or unintentionally – reflect the biases of the people and environment that create them, is crucial to reimagining the field. Nuclear security culture in the U.S. and around the world is intimately tied to the counterterrorism efforts that were put into place following the September 11, 2001, attacks. Nuclear security priorities reflect national security concerns, thus the conceptualization of ‘threat’ continues to place a disproportionate focus on foreign actors and movements, reproducing the ‘us’ vs ‘them’ distinction in security practices, even as threats facing national security evolve.²¹⁹ Even decades after the attacks, guidance for preventing radicalization relating to nuclear security focuses largely on “Jihadist” organizations or separatist movements.²²⁰

While focus on foreign threats and radicalization must be maintained, the guidance and framework for assessing threats must remain flexible enough to adapt to an evolving threat environment.

Maintaining disproportionate focus on foreign or externally influenced threats, when domestic actors presently pose a much larger concern in the domestic threat environment, demonstrates the institutionalized biases and exclusionary behaviors that can exacerbate the risks posed by insider threats. Understanding the limitations of the national and nuclear security as being designed to provide security for only some – mostly white-passing Americans – at the expense of people of color and those with foreign ties, can allow for a more nuanced understanding of the vulnerabilities facing the nuclear security field today. Looking ahead, a framework is needed to help revamp nuclear security systems and procedures to adapt to evolving threats and assess risk factors, not only more effectively, but more equitably to produce a more resilient and sustainable U.S. nuclear security regime.

1 Kelsey Davenport, “UN Security Council Resolution 1540 At a Glance,” Arms Control Association (February 2021), https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/1540

2 Nuclear Threat Initiative, Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) (2022), https://www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/global-initiat… Global Partnership, Why We Work (2023), https://www.gpwmd.com/why-we-work

3 Matthew Bunn, “Preventing a Nuclear 9/11,” How to Make America Safe: New Policies for National Security ed. Stephen Van Evera (Cambridge, MA: The Tobin Project, 2006): https://tobinproject.org/sites/default/files/assets/Make_America_Safe_Preventing_Nuclear_9_11.pdf

4 Scott Roecker, “A Call to Action on the Fifth Anniversary of the Final Nuclear Security Summit,” NTI Atomic Pulse (March 31, 2021), https://www.nti.org/atomic-pulse/call-action-fifth-anniversary-final-nuclear-securitysummit/

5 Eileen Sullivan and Katie Benner, “Top law enforcement officials say the biggest domestic terror threat comes from white supremacists,” The New York Times, (May 12, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/12/us/politics/domestic-terror-white-sup…

6 Seamus Huges, Ilana Krill, “Assessing US Domestic Extremism in Light of Capitol Riot Investigations,” International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (June 30, 2022) https://icct.nl/publication/assessing-us-domesticextremism-in-light-of-capitol-riot-investigations/

7 Van Dongen, Teun, Yannick Veilleux-Lepage, Eviane Leidig, Hanna Rigault Srkhis, “Right-Wing Extremism in the Military: A Typology of the Threat,” International Centre For Counter-Terrorism (May 2022).

8 Adam Goldman and Alan Feur, “Bias and Human Error Played Parts in F.B.I’s Jan. 6 Failure, Documents Suggest,” The New York Times (February 1, 2023) https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/01/us/politics/trump-jan-6- fbi.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringSource=articleShare

9 Adam Goldman and Alan Feur, “Bias and Human Error Played Parts in F.B.I’s Jan. 6 Failure, Documents Suggest,” The New York Times (February 1, 2023) https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/01/us/politics/trump-jan-6- fbi.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringSource=articleShare

10 Eileen Sullivan and Katie Benner, “Top law enforcement officials say the biggest domestic terror threat comes from white supremacists,” The New York Times, May 12, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/12/us/politics/domestic-terror-white-supremacists.html

11 “The Rising Threat of Domestic Terrorism, A Review of the Federal Response to Domestic Terrorism and the Spread of Extremist Content on Social Media” (November 16, 2022), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/majoritymedia/peters-investigative-report-shows-dhs-and-fbi-are-not-adequately-addressing-domestic-terrorism-threat

12 Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Homeland Security, “Strategic Intelligence Assessment and Data on Domestic Terrorism,” Submitted to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee of the Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives, and the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee of the Judiciary of the United States Senate (October 2022), https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/fbi-dhsdomestic-terrorism-strategic-report.pdf/view

13 Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Homeland Security, “Strategic Intelligence Assessment and Data on Domestic Terrorism,” Submitted to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee of the Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives, and the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee of the Judiciary of the United States Senate (October 2022), https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/fbi-dhsdomestic-terrorism-strategic-report.pdf/view

14 Eric Tucker and Mary Clare Jalonick, “FBI Chief Chris Wray Calls Jan. 5 ‘Domestic Terrorism,’ Defends Intel,” PBS News Hour (March 2, 2021), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/watch-live-fbi-chief-chris-wray-to-facequestions-about-extremism-capitol-riot

15 “‘This is our House!’: A Preliminary Assessment of the Capitol Hill Siege Participants,” Program on Extremism, The George Washington University (March 2021). https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/This-IsOur-Hous…

16 Catherine Morehouse, “Physical Attacks on Power Grid Surge to New Peak,” Politico (December 26, 2022), https://www.politico.com/news/2022/12/26/physical-attacks-electrical-grid-peak-00075216

17 Greg Harmon, “Rising Nazi Terror and Nuclear Power Risk: A Conversation with Edwin Lyman of the Union of Concerned Scientists,” Deceleration (February 13, 2023), https://deceleration.news/2023/02/13/rising-nazi-terrorand-nuclear-power-risk/

18 Michael Loadenthal, “Infrastructure, Sabotage, and Accelerationism,” Global Network on Extremism & Technology (February 15, 2021), https://gnet-research.org/2021/02/15/infrastructure-sabotage-and-acceler…

19 Greg Harmon, “Rising Nazi Terror and Nuclear Power Risk: A Conversation with Edwin Lyman of the Union of Concerned Scientists,” Deceleration (February 13, 2023), https://deceleration.news/2023/02/13/rising-nazi-terrorand-nuclear-power-risk/

20 Greg Harmon, “Rising Nazi Terror and Nuclear Power Risk: A Conversation with Edwin Lyman of the Union of Concerned Scientists,” Deceleration (February 13, 2023), https://deceleration.news/2023/02/13/rising-nazi-terrorand-nuclear-power-risk/

21 Janet Reitman, “All-American Nazis,” Rolling Stone (May 2, 2018), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/all-american-nazis-628023/

22 Bruce Hoffman, “A Year After January 6, is Accelerationism the New Terrorist Threat?” Council on Foreign Relations (January 5, 2022), https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/year-after-january-6-accelerationism-new-te… (Accessed April 14, 2022).

23 Michael Loadenthal, “Modern Fascism’s Fascination with ‘Good Ol’ Family’ Values of an Imagined Past,” California Institute of Integrated Studies (May 22, 2021), https://digitalcommons.ciis.edu/lavlang/2021/saturday/11/

24 “Atomwaffen,” Southern Poverty Law Center (Accessed April 18, 2023), https://www.splcenter.org/fightinghate/extremist-files/group/atomwaffen-division

25 Alex Newhouse, “The Threat Is the Network: The Multi-Node Structure of Neo-Fascist Accelerationism,” in CTC Sentinel, Vol 14, No 5, (West Point: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, June 2021), p. 17 – 25; https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/CTC-SENTINEL-052021.pdf (accessed November 9, 2021)

26 Greg Huffman, “Far-right accelerationists hope to spark the next U.S. civil war,” Institute for Southern Studies, (February 3, 2021), https://www.facingsouth.org/2021/02/far-right-accelerationists-hope-spar… ; David Gartenstein-Ross, Samual Hodgson, and Colin P. Clarke, “The Growing Threat Posed by Accelerationism and Accelerationist Groups Worldwide,” Foreign Policy Research Institute (April 20, 2020), https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/04/the-growing-threat-posed-by-accelerationism-and-accelerationist-groupsworldwide/

27 Jordan Green, “‘Part of the war is terror’: A new neo-Nazi group is trying to capitalize on the Moore County power grid attack,” Raw Story (December 19, 2022), https://www.rawstory.com/moore-grid/

28 Jordan Green, “‘Part of the war is terror’: A new neo-Nazi group is trying to capitalize on the Moore County power grid attack,” Raw Story (December 19, 2022), https://www.rawstory.com/moore-grid/

29 Jordan Green, “‘Part of the war is terror’: A new neo-Nazi group is trying to capitalize on the Moore County power grid attack,” Raw Story (December 19, 2022), https://www.rawstory.com/moore-grid/

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213 Sneha Nair, “Reimagining U.S. foreign policy as an anti-racist endeavor,” in Equality and Racial Justice: Where Do They Fit in a National Security Strategy? (Washington, D.C., U.S.: New America, 2022) https://www.newamerica.org/political-reform/reports/equity-and-racial-ju…

214 Smith, R. M. and King, D., “White Protectionism in America” in Perspectives on Politics, Volume 19, Issue (2, June 2021), pp. 460 – 478, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/perspectives-on-politics/article/whiteprotectionism-in-america/466CB9F794DBC364C79B401EA81ADDD5

215 German, M., Disrupt, Discredit, Divide: How the New FBI Damages Democracy, (New York, U.S.A., The New Press, 2019), pp. 65-88

216 Matthew Bunn and Scott Sagan, A Worst Practice Guide to Insider Threats: Lessons from Past Mistakes (Cambridge, U.S.A.: American Academy of Arts & Sciences, 2014), https://www.amacad.org/sites/default/files/publication/downloads/insiderThreats.pdf

217 Bonnie Jenkins, “Redefining Our Concept of Security,” in Order from Chaos, (Washington, D.C., U.S.A.: Brookings Institution, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/12/04/redefining-our-conceptof-security/

218 Bonnie Jenkins, “Redefining Our Concept of Security,” in Order from Chaos, (Washington, D.C., U.S.A.: Brookings Institution, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/12/04/redefining-ou…

219 Cynthia Miller-Idriss, “The War on Terror Supercharged the Far Right,” Foreign Affairs, (October 2021), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-08-24/war-on-… jan6?utm_medium=promo_email&utm_source=lo_flows&utm_campaign=registered_user_welcome&utm_term=e mail_1&utm_content=20211115

220 Geoffrey Chapman, G., et. al. Radicalisation and Preventative Measures: An Educational Handbook of Insider Threat Case Studies, (London, U.K.,: Center for Science and Security Studies, 2018), https://www.kcl.ac.uk/csss/assets/radicalisation-preventative-measures-h…

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Domestic Violent Extremists’ Threat to U.S. Nuclear Facilities

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