U.S. Infrastructure Is Broken | Wiretap Bill That Critics Call “Stasi-Like” | The Warship’s Remote Operator: Who Is the Captain Now?, and more

Mr. Trump’s case did not come up at the argument, which was largely focused on trying to make sense of a statute, enacted to address white-collar crime, that all concerned agreed was not a model of clarity. But the justices’questions also considered the gravity of the assault and whether prosecutors have been stretching the law to reach members of the mob responsible for the attack, which interrupted certification of Joseph R. Biden Jr.’s electoral victory.
The question for the justices was whether one of the laws used to prosecute some of the members of the mob that stormed the Capitol fits their conduct. The law, a provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, contains a broad catchall provision that makes it a crime to corruptly obstruct, influence or impede any official proceeding.
But the provision is linked to a previous one aimed at altering evidence. Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. said the catchall provision must be read in context. Since the Jan. 6 defendants were not accused of altering evidence, he said, the catchall provision did not apply.
Other members of the court’s conservative majority said that reading the catchall provision in isolation would allow prosecutions of all sorts of protesters.

The Warship’s Remote Operator: Who Is the Captain Now?  (Manal Cheema and Ariel Sarandinaki, Lawfare)
On Jan. 16, four of the U.S. Navy’s unmanned surface vessel (USV) prototypes (meaning a vessel that can operate without a human crew) recently returned from operations in the Western Pacific. Over several months in late 2023, these vessels—named Ranger, Mariner, Sea Hunter, and Sea Hawk—made port calls to Japan, Guam, Australia, and other nations, as part of a multilateral exercise to test the operation of unmanned systems. According to the Navy, this deployment was focused, at least in part, on command and control. During their time at sea, Navy researchers tested several ways to control the vessels using various configurations of operators and consoles—both from ashore at an Unmanned Operations Center in Port Hueneme, California, and at sea from another U.S. Navy ship in the region. Ranger and Mariner in particular were “testing more advanced autonomy features under the supervision of a civilian crew which [was] under orders to observe, but not interfere unless absolutely necessary.”
The advent of USVs for military use has raised important questions, such as: Does international law prohibit or restrict the use of USVs in peacetime or in conflict? What body of law, established or novel, should govern their use? Perhaps most importantly, who is responsible for missteps or miscalculations in the use of these vessels? Among these inquiries—which are largely the basis of observers’ and policymakers’ discussions—two central questions remain mostly unexamined. First, would the presence of a civilian master mariner aboard a U.S. military USV affect the vessel’s status under international law? Second, how would the ability of this civilian—or any human aboard the ship—to override a USV’s preset orders or parameters impact the remote commanding officer’s responsibility for any wrongful conduct? 
Put simply: Who is the captain now? 

Call in the Coast Guard: How Maritime Law Enforcement Can Combat China’s Gray-Zone Aggression  (Eric Cooper, War on the Rocks)
Earlier this year, China’s Coast Guard forced a Filipino fishing boat captain and crew away from Scarborough Shoal, which the United Nations International Tribunal has established as the territory of the Philippines, demanding that they dump their catch. Indeed, China’s Coast Guard continues to use aggression and force to coerce and intimidate other nations — even in those other nations’ territorial waters. China’s Coast Guard also routinely forces collisions with Filipino fishing and supply vessels, and harasses other vessels in the South China Sea. China views these gray-zone tactics as a natural extension of national power, and its flagrant violation of international law will likely continue unless Indo-Pacific stakeholders begin to impose consequences for such actions.
Despite renewed emphasis by the Biden, Trump, and Obama administrations, America’s commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific has struggled under Chinese pressure — including both gray-zone operations in East Asian waters and China’s Belt and Road Initiative more broadly. Moreover, U.S. influence in the Indo-Pacific has waned, as evidenced by the fact that nations such as Kiribati, the Solomon Islands, and Nauru have recently switched their diplomatic recognition from U.S.-friendly Taiwan to China.
Still, all is not lost for the United States in the Indo-Pacific. Both Palau and the Federated States of Micronesia recently signed agreements that will allow the U.S. Coast Guard to enforce maritime law on behalf of those countries without having a representative of those countries onboard U.S. vessels. The United States should build on this momentum, developing a coordinated international approach to the region that will establish a combined force of coast guards and maritime law enforcement agencies, with a persistent focus from this force on fortifying international norms.

Review Finds U.S. Troops Did Not Spot ISIS-K Suicide Bomber Before Abbey Gate Attack  (Matt Seyler, ABC News)
Members of a Marine scout sniper team who believed they could have taken out the suicide bomber ahead of the catastrophic attack at Kabul’s Hamid Karzai International Airport during the final days of the American withdrawal from Afghanistan were mistaken, a review ordered by U.S. Central Command has determined.
“Over the past two years, some service members have claimed that they had the bomber in their sights and they could have prevented the attack. We now know that is not correct,” a member of the supplemental review team, which was tasked with building on the military’s initial investigation by taking into account newer information and claims that have surfaced, told reporters in a recent briefing.
In another significant revelation, members of the team identified Abdul Rahman al-Logari as the terrorist responsible for killing 13 American service members and some 170 Afghans when on Aug. 26 2021 he detonated a suicide vest laden with 20 pounds of military-grade explosives near the airport’s Abbey Gate. The blast sent a mass of 5-millimeter ball bearings ripping through the densely-packed crowd. This is the first time U.S. officials have confirmed al-Logari was the bomber.
Al-Logari had been a member of the Islamic State in Khorasan Province group, or ISIS-K, since 2016, according to a member of the review team from the Army.

The Great Replacement Theory & Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremists  (Lindsey Bergman, Georgetown Security Studies Review)
In the midst of frustration and legitimate political discourse over concerns with U.S. immigration policy, there has been a surge in the use of violent language consistent with the Great Replacement Theory to promote violence against immigrants at the U.S. southern border. As defined by the Counter Extremism Project, the “great replacement theory” states non-white immigrants are replacing white populations. While various ethno-nationalist groups who adhere to the great replacement theory state they are non-violent, others use the Great Replacement Theory to justify violence, as evidenced by the 2019 New Zealand Mosque shooter who named his manifesto “The Great Replacement.” The surge in the use of violent online language to describe immigrants at the U.S. southern border normalizes dehumanizing language that promotes the bigoted “great replacement theory,” which not only foments discord amongst the U.S. population but also may lead to violence.”