MILITARY TECHNOLOGYIran’s Neutralized Counterstrike: Israel’s Air Defense Operation Was Effective—Just Not Necessarily Replicable
The immediate outcome of the thwarted Iranian missile attack on Israel is the clear evidence it provides that integrated air and ground air defense systems can provide adequate coverage against saturation attacks—at least under certain conditions. The point is, few other countries will be able to recreate Israel’s air defense successes.
Iran directly moved against Israel over the weekend with a three-pronged saturation attack consisting of approximately 185 Shahed drones, 110 medium-range ballistic missiles, and 36 land-attack cruise missiles. The Iranian attack came after a weeklong telegraphed buildup of tensions triggered by the Israeli strike against the Iranian consulate in Damascus, Syria. In spite of, or perhaps because of, this extensive preparation phase, Tehran’s hope for an overwhelming bombardment of Israeli targets appears to be largely foiled. The vast majority of incoming munitions were intercepted by a variety of layered air defense systems, with the only substantive impacts appearing to be on Ramon air base in the Negev, far to the south of the main body of the Israeli air defense network. Since the runways at Ramon were undoubtedly cleared by scrambling the aircraft long before the missiles arrived, it is unlikely any hits on grounded aircraft were scored. The Israel Defense Forces released footage of engineers already repairing the minor cratering done to the runway, underscoring the optics of the Iranian attack being rendered largely ineffective.
Regardless of whether the attack was launched for a performative or a strictly military purpose and setting aside the panoply of political, strategic, and other questions it raises, its immediate outcome should be viewed as clear evidence that integrated air and ground air defense systems can provide adequate coverage against saturation attacks—at least under certain conditions. Simply put, the old assumption that states could invest in plentiful and cheap ballistic and cruise missiles to provide a sort of “poor man’s air force” for power projection has shown to be wanting. Just as the 1990 Gulf War proved the massive superiority of modern precision weapons against massed armored formations, so has the Iranian attack shown that integrated air defense systems are not all hype. China’s leaders will be taking notes, just as they did in 1990. For attacks like this to succeed, far more preparation of the battlefield is required.
Iran launched this attack using the same assumptions as Saddam Hussein’s strategic bombing of Iranian population centers during the 1980s Iran-Iraq War—a series of campaigns dubbed the “War of the Cities.” No radar jamming, suppression of enemy air defense, or interdiction of Israeli aircraft was attempted—only a massive, coordinated launch of three types of independently operating aerial munitions with marginal accuracy. (Cont.)
