Increasing cooperation between security, health officials

of incredulity out there that you really want to spend your money improving others’ disease surveillance and capacity,” Millet told Park, the State Department official. “Beyond that, in some quarters, there’s still some suspicion out there as to, ‘Where’s the catch?’”

All three experts welcomed the increased interaction between the two communities but also warned that there are certain risks involved.

“On the one hand, global public health engagement by the security sector is a very welcome development” because of the potential support benefits it provides, Fukuda told the audience. “On the other hand … if [public health] is perceived as becoming an instrument of security concerns, then it really is in danger of having deviated away from its mandate” to improve human development and overall wellbeing, he said.

“The key issue is striking the right balance,” Fukuda added.

Disease surveillance efforts to deal with deliberate disease use should, for the most part, reinforce existing efforts designed to improve health and safety, according to Millet. “Security resources can and should bring added value to these efforts. There are some things that health and safety capacity should not, [and] cannot, do,” he said.

As to the inherent tension between the two disciplines, Millet said: “I’m not sure it’s an easy problem to put a size on, but I can tell you it is a durable problem.”

Park noted that the White House approach to the BWC had been criticized by security officials in a few European governments and the academic community who believe that utilizing the convention for disease surveillance is “soft.”

“People from traditional arms control are not used to thinking about it this way, but if you look at the range of problems we face, prevention is an important approach,” Park said.

The single most important issue at the international level, Fukuda said, is trust between the security and health communities. Resources, as well as sacrifices, must be shared equally by both sides, he told the audience.

Even though the two camps are now closer than ever, they should avoid trying to define what constitutes “health security,” panelists warned. “I don’t want to get into a protracted, 163-nation negotiation to develop a definition of health security,” said Park, referring to the number of member nations to the Biological Weapons Convention.

He added that the topic had come up at a recent conference held by the State Department featuring representatives of both communities from roughly 40 allied nations.

The discussion “got very messy, very quickly,” according to Park.

There is still confusion at the international level as to what the term entails, according to Millet. He said that a reference to the phrase was removed from a common understanding last year after one country noted there is no internationally recognized definition of it.

Fukuda agreed the topic “remains an alive issue” but said that tackling it as a “definitional issue is a dead-end approach.”