Iran's nukes: the state of play

weapons of mass destruction. Iran put the brakes on its nuclear program. When the Shiite regime eventually resumed the quest for nuclear capability, the emphasis was on its weakness: the ability to enrich uranium. Some effort was paid to the development and improvement of “dual use” components. Which means components that could be explained away to the international community as having a different purpose, but could be used in a nuclear bomb. There is also a top-secret effort to develop and test components specific to a nuclear bomb. He singled out the neutron initiator as an example. This acts like a spark plug to begin a nuclear reaction.

The source told Tobin he believes Iran is trying to minimize its breakout time before making a sprint toward a nuclear weapon. There will come a point when Iran takes a step, which removes any doubt in the international community that the ambition is indeed a weapon. That step will shock the international community into action and bring a great deal of pressure on Iran. Leaders of that country want that pressure to be on them for as short a time as possible until they can announce they have the bomb.

The source predicts the breakout will occur when Iran makes the move toward highly enriched or weapons grade uranium. Uranium sits in the ground at 0.7 percent purity. To fuel a nuclear power plant you only need to get the uranium to 3.5 percent purity. Weapons grade uranium is 93.5 percent pure. Tobin notes that 3.5 percent purity does not mean the uranium is only a fraction of the way toward weapons grade. The source says once the uranium is at fuel grade, 60 percent of the work has already been done. If the uranium is brought up to 20 percent purity, only a short step remains to arrive at weapons grade. Iran has already enriched a small amount to 20 percent purity saying it was for the research reactor in Tehran.

So, the source believes Iran is buying time, preparing and testing components for a weapon. The focus is on building better confidence with their centrifuges and stockpiling fuel grade uranium. That way, when the regime decides, Iran can make a bold move and the mad dash to get a weapon before the world can stop it. No one knows when the starter gun will fire for that sprint to start. “The answer is that we don’t know when they will have a bomb. They don’t know.”

Iran’s glaring vulnerability is still enrichment. “The centrifuges are Pakistani by design. They are not good centrifuges.” Tobin notes that the enrichment facility at Qom was not working. Other centrifuges also crash frequently. Although Iran possesses a vast underground network of tunnels, the intelligence community believes the only working centrifuges are in Natanz. “We do not know of another enrichment facility,” the source said.

Iran does have more than a dozen nuclear facilities spread out around the country. However, because all of the effective centrifuges are in one location, there exists a target for air strikes, which could effectively set back Iran’s nuclear program. “If Natanz is hit or severely damaged in terms of capacity…the Iranian program will be compromised, damaged. They will not have the capability to enrich,” the source told Tobin.