TrendTerrorists' tactics may be shifting

Contrast two differet styles of terorist attacks: on the one side is 9/11, which required months, if not years, of meticuolous planning, preparation, and training. On the other side are attacks such as the one on 7/7 and the attacks two weeks ago in London and Glasgow. The latter attacks, or attempted attacks, resemble more the quick-hit strikes used by isurgents in Iraq. The Wall Street Journal’s Robert Block writes that we may be witnessing a shift in tactics by Osama bin Laden’s planners, who, beginning with the first attempt on the Twin Towers in 1993, tended to favor spectacular, coordinated assaults. More specifically, security analysts fear the two styles of terorist attacks could be merged.

The attempts two weeks ago to attack London nightclubs is a perfect example of a quick-hit strike: There is no need for much planning, preparation, or training: All it takes is a car loaded with gasoline cans and nails (or, as was the case with Timothy McVeigh, a truck loaded with readily available fertilizer). The quick-hit strikes may not be as specatcular or ambitious as 9/11, but they can be exceedingly deadly and unnerving. Moreover — and here we come to the fears expressed by security experts — because of their simplicity, such attacks are much more difficult to detect or prevent.

The shift in terrorist tactics force security agencies to grapple with the problem of allocating resources: Should more money, manpower, and attention be dedicated to detecting and disrupting major catastrophic attacks, or should resources be more effectively used in shadowing and tracking a far greater number of potential terorists in the hope of detecting and disrupting the smaller but more likely attacks on, say, shopping malls using a homemade gasoline bomb or legally acquired firearms? “The need to disrupt an ever-wider range of plots, and to investigate suspects who at first might only seem peripheral, puts a major strain on our resources,” says Michael Downing, the Los Angeles deputy police chief for counterterrorism. “We need this richer picture of intelligence to do our job, but it comes at a high price.”

Block quotes security experts to say that in the face of wide-ranging counterterrorism efforts around the world, al-Qaeda has adopted a two-pronged, and parallel, strategy: One is to encourage local Muslims to join the organization’s jihad and kill however they can. The second is to continue with al-Qaeda’s hallmark attacks, which emphasize long-range, patient planning and preparation for spectacular attacks on symbolic targets in the West.

Note that DHS has been aware of this possible tactical shift by al-Qaeda, and already in August 2005 published an unclassified study called “Speculating on an al-Zarqawi Campaign against the Homeland,” which said that Western countries should be prepared for waves of quickly planned and executed attacks. The report noted that while al-Qaeda focused on large iconic targets in operations involving years of planning, Zarqawi’s attacks in Iraq were far less sophisticated. “They do not require experienced operatives and can be planned and executed in a matter of days or weeks, vice [sic] years. His targets are ones of opportunity — accessible and vulnerable — and his methods of attacks include suicide car bombings, improvised explosive device attacks, kidnappings and assassinations.”

The report said that if Zarqawi, who was killed in June 2006, were to lead attacks against the United States, the campaigns would likely involve fewer operatives, shorter planning timelines, and focus on soft targets. The plots would, by their very nature, “be more difficult to detect during the planning stages and more difficult to prevent during the execution stages.” U.K. security officials say the latest British bomb plots appear to be a hybrid of Zarqawi’s methods and al Qaeda’s use of multiple, coordinated attacks. The two car bombs were meant to explode outside separate London nightclubs. The plot also involved seemingly untrained operatives and simple bombs made from household items.

In short, what 7/7 and the terrorist attempts two weeks ago may indicate that we are facing a new a new model of Islamist terror, a model which relies on hasty planning, simple weapons, and minimal training. This kind of terrorism is tougher to track and stop than more ambitious attacks. The result is that security services must now weigh more carefully what is the most effective way to concentrate finite resources to minimize the danger.