Worries about safety of U.S. biodefense labs

Published 5 October 2007

Since 2003, U.S. labs handling the world’s deadliest germs and toxins have experienced more than 100 accidents; as research into bioterrorism intesifies, number of accidents grows

Supporters of placing biodefense labs in resdiential areas — Boston comes to mind — should hope that a recently published report does not fall into the hands of those who opposed the labs. American laboratories handling the world’s deadliest germs and toxins have experienced more than 100 accidents and missing shipments since 2003, and the number is growing as more labs do the work. No one died, and regulators said that the public was never at risk during these incidents, but the documented cases reflect poorly on procedures and oversight at high-security labs, some of which work with organisms and poisons that can cause illnesses with no cure. In some cases, labs have failed to report accidents as required by law. The mishaps include workers bitten or scratched by infected animals, skin cuts, needle sticks and more, according to a review by AP of confidential reports submitted to federal regulators. They describe accidents involving anthrax, bird-flu virus, monkeypox, and plague-causing bacteria at 44 labs in 24 states. More than 20 incidents were still under investigation. The number of accidents has risen steadily. Through August, the most recent period covered in the reports obtained by the AP, labs reported 36 accidents and lost shipments during 2007 — nearly double the number reported during all of 2004. Likewise, the number of labs approved by the government to handle the deadliest substances has nearly doubled to 409 since 2004, and there are now 15 of the highest-security labs. Labs are routinely inspected by federal regulators just once every three years, but accidents trigger interim inspections.

In a new report, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) said that little is known about labs that are not federally financed or do not work with any of seventy-two dangerous substances the government monitors most closely. “No single federal agency … has the mission to track the overall number of these labs in the United States,” said the GAO’s report, expected to be released later this week. “Consequently, no agency is responsible for determining the risks associated with the proliferation of these labs.”

Lab accidents have affected the outside world: Britain’s health and safety agency concluded that there was a “strong probability” that a leaking pipe at a British lab that manufactures vaccines for hoof-and-mouth disease was the source of an outbreak of the illness in livestock earlier this year. Britain suspended exports of livestock, meat and milk and destroyed hundreds of animals suspected of being infected. Accidents are not the only worry. Although medical experts consider it unlikely that a lab employee will become sick and infect others, the labs have strict rules to prevent anyone from stealing organisms or toxins and using them for bioterrorism. The reports were so sensitive that the Bush administration refused to release them under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), referring to an anti-bioterrorism law intended to prevent terrorists from locating stockpiles of poisons and learning who handles them. A senior CDC official, Dr. Richard Besser, said that his agency is committed to making sure that U.S. labs are safe and that all such incidents are disclosed to the government. He said he was unaware of any risk to the public resulting from infections among workers at the high-security labs.