Aussie intelligence chiefs fear nuclear war between Israel and Iran
treaty as part of a broader effort to head off the development of an Iranian nuclear weapons capability and to establish the Middle East as a nuclear weapon-free zone.
The U.S. embassy’s report in March last year told Washington the Australian government was “more broadly concerned about the potential for renewed nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, driving south-east Asian states to abandon the [nuclear non-proliferation treaty] and pursue their own nuclear capabilities, which could introduce a direct threat to the Australian homeland.”
Australian intelligence views on Iran were solicited by U.S. officials in response to a request from Washington to ascertain reactions to the possibility that the U.S. might seek to engage Tehran in dialogue on security.
The cables confirm the presence in Canberra of representatives of all U.S. national intelligence agencies — the CIA, National Security Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, National Geospatial Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the FBI.
U.S. intelligence liaison officers engaged all their Australian counterpart agencies on the Iran question — including ONA, the office of the National Security Adviser, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, the Defense Intelligence Organization, the Defense Signals Directorate, the Defense Imagery and Geospatial Organization, the Defense Science and Technology Organization, and the Australian Security Intelligence Organization.
In its July 2009 report to Washington, the embassy noted that the Australian intelligence community “has increased its collection and analytic efforts on Iran over the past decade, demonstrating Australia’s strategic commitment to engage substantively as a significant U.S. partner on Iran.”
U.S. diplomats expressed “high confidence” that the Australian government would have no objections to U.S. efforts to engage Iran, noting that while Australian troops remained stationed in Afghanistan “the Australians will look to increased U.S. engagement with Iran to improve upon creating a realistic framework for an accelerated reduction and eventual cessation of Iranian support to the Taliban, al-Qaeda and related groups, and Hezbollah.
Simultaneously, Australia will look for increased U.S.-Iranian engagement to lead to a more stable governance environment for Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and the Levant”.
The cable on the December 2008 intelligence exchange on Iran reported Varghese’s view that possible conflict between Israel and Iran “clearly represented the greatest challenge to [Middle East] stability - and ONA was focusing most of its attention on Tehran because of it.”
ONA analysts expressed the view that the Iranian government appeared determined to acquire nuclear weapons, though this would probably be driven by the desire to deter Israel and the United States than an intention to strike against other Middle East states.
“ONA viewed Tehran’s nuclear program within the paradigm of ‘the laws of deterrence’, noting that Iran’s ability to produce a weapon may be ‘enough’ to meet its security objectives,” the U.S. embassy reported to Washington.
“Nevertheless, Australian intelligence viewed Tehran’s pursuit of full self-sufficiency in the nuclear fuel cycle, long-standing covert weapons program, and continued work on delivery systems as strong indicators that Tehran’s preferred end state included a nuclear arsenal.”
ONA analysts told their U.S. counterparts that they were not alone in this assessment, asserting “while China and Russia remain opposed to it, they view Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons as inevitable.”
ONA, however, urged a balanced view of Tehran as a sophisticated diplomatic player rather than a “rogue state” liable to behave impulsively or irrationally. Varghese said ONA was telling the Australian government: ”It’s a mistake to think of Iran as a ‘rogue state’.”
The embassy cable reported: ”ONA analysts assessed that Tehran ‘knows’ about its lack of certain capabilities, but plays ‘beyond its hand’ very skillfully.
ONA analysts commented that Iran’s Persian culture was a key factor in understanding its strategic behavior, commenting that a ‘mixture of hubris and paranoia’ pervades Iranian attitudes that in turn shape Tehran’s threat perceptions and policies.
The Australian intelligence analysts, however, “asserted that 20 years of hostility [towards the U.S.] and associated rhetoric aside, regime attitudes ‘have fairly shallow roots’, and the most effective means by which Tehran could ensure its national security would be a strategic relationship with the U.S. via some ‘grand bargain’.”
