The Israel-Hamas prisoner exchange

>For Israel:

• The Shalit release has become a cause célèbre in Israel – with the plight of the Shalit family galvanizing the nation. Thousands participated in marches and demonstration demanding that the government agree to even the most extravagant demands in order to bring Shalit home.
• Israel has always embraced the ethos of doing everything it could to return imprisoned soldiers home – almost regardless of the price to be paid (something Hezbollah and Hamas know very well). There were one or two occasions when Israel dragged its feet – and the price paid was high. Twenty-five years ago, an Israeli pilot named Ron Arad bailed out over Lebanon and was captured by Hezbollah. Negotiations, through intermediaries, between Israel and Hezbollah – and Israel and Iran, where it is assumed Arad was transferred – did not go well because Israel balked at the price demanded by Hezbollah and the Iranians. Arad has never been heard from. Note that some Israeli analysts believe the Arad was not captured alive, and the Hezbollah’s negotiations for his release were not much more than a cruel trick. Hezbollah has always refused to return to Israel even the bodies of dead soldiers, always insisting on a price for such an exchange. When it came to Shalit, successive Israeli government vowed he would not be another Arad.
• Domestically, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahoo needed a victory of his own: under barrage of criticism for what many regard as his intransigence on the Israeli-Palestinian front, and for the economic policies of his government, he, too, needed a big victory – and needed it now.
• There is anger in Israel at the move by the PA to bring the issue of Palestinian statehood to the UN. There is little doubt that Israel wanted to remind Mahmood Abbas and his PA that Israel can take steps to upset the PA. Israel will be better off with the PA leading the Palestinians rather than Hamas – but Israel felt that the PA need to be reminded that unilateral moves – such as the appeal to the UN — would not be the best way to bring Israel to make concessions on the ground.
• The Arab Spring has introduced an element of unpredictability into Middle Eastern politics. The feeling in Israeli national security circles was that better to secure the release of Shalit now – especially against to backdrop of some moderation in Hamas negotiating position – rather than wait for better terms in an uncertain future. It was also not clear how longer the Egyptian regime will be in a position of helping mediate a deal – especially if the pro-Hamas Muslim Brotherhood would become even stronger in Egyptian politics.
• Other analysts point out the underlying all the moves on the Shalit issue was the looming crisis with Iran. These analysts say the Prime Minister Barak and Minister of Defense Ehud Barak wanted to “clean the table” of as many troublesome issues as possible in order to be able to mobilize both domestic and regional opinion for a likely Israeli military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities. Moreover, Hamas is one of Iran’s regional agents – and there is little doubt that in the event of an Israeli attack on Iran, Hamas – and Iran’s other agent, Hezbollah – will be instructed to fire their missiles and rockets on Israel as part of an Iranian retaliation. It was also feared that if Shalit was still in Hamas hands, the Hamas leadership would likely order his killing to inflict more pain on Israel.

Ben Frankel is the editor of the Homeland Security NewsWire