BiothreatsExperts question BioWatch’s replacement

Published 26 February 2019

BioWatch, the program launched more than fifteen years ago to detect bioterrorism attacks in major American cities, has been routinely criticized for not living up to its early promise. Many have suggested doing away with the system all together. Trouble is, experts say that BioDetection 21 – DHS’s proposed replacement for BioWatch – is even less effective.

BioWatch, the program launched more than fifteen years ago to detect bioterrorism attacks in major American cities, has been routinely criticized for not living up to its early promise. Many have suggested doing away with the system all together.

The Trump administration though is planning to replace BioWatch with BioDetection 21, which will see more than 9,000 bio-detection sensors deployed across the United States by 2025.

David Willman, writing in the Los Angeles Times (“Homeland Security replacing troubled biodefense system with another flawed approach”) is unconvinced:

a lengthy report last fall, commissioned by Homeland Security’s scientific staff, warned that the trigger devices frequently can’t distinguish between deadly pathogens and airborne pollen or paper dust, increasing the likelihood of false alarms.

The report also showed that four trigger devices failed in testing last year to detect tiny, unclumped anthrax spores — the type that experts say a skilled terrorist or state-sponsored biowarfare program might produce.

Moreover, the triggers correctly detected small particles of viral material — simulating smallpox or other deadly viruses that could be weaponized — in just eight of 168 attempts, a success rate of less than 5%.

Trigger devices have “clear limitations … for detection of smaller particles and some biological threat categories,” the report said.

The Times obtained a copy of the report, which was produced by the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory. “The findings were consistent with Homeland Security’s earlier evaluations of triggers, according to current and former federal scientists.”

Given the drawbacks of the triggers and handheld identifiers, Homeland Security risks replacing BioWatch with a system that would be even less useful, according to several current and former government scientists who have led federal efforts to improve biodetection.

“The technology hasn’t evolved to the point where it would be an effective replacement’’ for BioWatch, said Stephen A. Morse, a microbiologist who worked for 32 years at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

Willman’s verdict: Replacing BioWatch with BioDetection 21 means that an already-questionable system would be replaced by a system which offers even fewer benefits.