Taiwan’s Will to Fight Isn’t the Problem  (Raymond Kuo and Catherine Kish, War on the Rocks)
China’s increasingly powerful military has bracketed Taiwan with exercises. Its air and naval forces launch daily incursions, and Beijing has erased the unofficial maritime border between them. Yet, many Americans are baffled by a Taiwanese public that is seemingly oblivious, resigned, or apathetic to these threats.
Taiwan’s former cultural minister lamented the absence of a “will to fight” crucial to the island’s defense. Current Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby has criticized Taiwan for “showing an alarming lack of urgency in dramatically strengthening its defenses.” Why should the United States defend Taiwan if Taiwan won’t defend itself?
But a closer look shows that the real problem is political polarization, not will to fight.

Trump Nixed $400 Million in Taiwan Military Aid, Pushing Future Arms Sales  (Noah Robertson and Ellen Nakashima, Washington Post)
President Donald Trump declined to approve a package of weapons to Taiwan this summer, as he tries to negotiate a trade deal and potential summit with Chinese leader Xi Jinping.

Russia Is Shrewdly Playing the Long Game in Africa (Hanna Notte, War on the Rocks)
What if Moscow’s most dangerous moves right now aren’t in Europe, but along the Gulf of Guinea?
With its resources sunk deep into Ukraine, the Russian military has weighed carefully whether and when to engage elsewhere, standing aside amid recent conflicts in the South Caucasus and Middle East. An exception to this pattern of inaction is in West Africa. After the failed mutiny of Wagner Group chief Yevgeny Prigozhin in June 2023, the Russian government established a new paramilitary group called Africa Corps, tethered closely to the military chain of command. The unit then progressively took over most of Wagner’s operations in Africa and expanded into Burkina Faso and Niger. It now seems to be eyeing a presence in Benin and Togo next. These activities suggest that Russia is seeking a West African foothold on which to build once an end to the war on Ukraine frees up additional conventional military forces. Russia may then try to further extend Africa Corps’ presence.
In pursuit of these ambitions, the Kremlin follows a deliberate strategy. Africa Corps’ expanding footprint is low investment, low risk, directed by the Russian government, and embedded in broader political efforts. It is accompanied by Russian state corporations looking to secure business deals. In choosing target countries for Africa Corps’ deployments, the Russian government seems focused on obtaining port access in the Gulf of Guinea, a region rich in hydrocarbon resources and an important maritime transit hub. At present, Africa Corps’ presence may be modest and appear of limited consequence to U.S. and European security. But as it expands, Russia may be able to gain access to valuable mineral resources and entrench authoritarian governance while projecting maritime power into NATO’s southern flank. U.S. and European policymakers should watch these developments closely and check Africa Corps’ influence through a coordinated response.