ArgumentThe Next Deadly Pathogen Could Come from a Rogue Scientist. Here’s How We Can Prevent That.

Published 17 February 2020

In the past few years, something new has become possible in biology: cheaply “printing” DNA for insertion into a cell. Kelsey Piper writes in Vox that this means a scientist who needs a particular DNA sequence to, say, create new bacteria for research can now order that DNA sequence from a lab. “But what if I asked them to print for me the genetic code of the influenza that caused the 1918 flu that killed millions of people? What if I sent them the instructions for a new disease that I have reason to believe is dangerous? What if I was doing legitimate research, but my lab didn’t adhere to modern safety standards?”

In the past few years, something new has become possible in biology: cheaply “printing” DNA for insertion into a cell.

Kelsey Piper writes in Vox that this means a scientist who needs a particular DNA sequence to, say, create new bacteria for research can now order that DNA sequence from a lab. That might seem like a niche technology — how many biologists need to custom-print their own DNA? — but DNA synthesis and assembly (as the “printing” process is called) are actually useful for an astonishing variety of research uses, and could have far-reaching implications for how we live. 

Piper notes that as is often the case, the coordination, control, and the development of safety guidelines is lagging far behind the potential – for good and bad – of the technology of synthetic biology.

As a private individual, I can send a DNA sequence I’d like synthesized to dozens of labs around the world that can print it out and send it to me.

But what if I asked them to print for me the genetic code of the influenza that caused the 1918 flu that killed millions of people? What if I sent them the instructions for a new disease that I have reason to believe is dangerous? What if I was doing legitimate research, but my lab didn’t adhere to modern safety standards?

The answer is that a few DNA synthesis companies will send me what I asked for, with no screening to check whether they’re sending out a pathogen that ought to be carefully controlled.

Some companies — including most industry-leading ones — do follow US guidelines that require a background check and also check the DNA sequence against a list of known hazardous ones and would stop me from making this dangerous order — but a recent report found no evidence of any laws requiring laboratories to follow those guidelines in any country in the world. Doing so adds some time and expense to the ordering process, so there is some incentive to cut corners.

That’s why many experts argue that we need to do better. Their proposals on how to fix the system vary, but they all agree on one thing: I shouldn’t be allowed to order myself the 1918 influenza or a new coronavirus off the internet and have it delivered to my home.