ARGUMENT: POST WAR -- ADVANTAGE WESTEurope After the Ukraine War

Published 23 March 2022

The war in Ukraine is still raging, and its outcome not yet certain, but there is no doubt that the war, in Ralph Cohen’s words, is “a watershed historical event.” He highlights four macro-levels trends which are upending the strategic balance in Europe. Russia will likely emerge weaker but, perhaps, no less dangerous, but Europe will likely become stronger militarily, less energy dependent, and more unified against Russia.

Bombs still falling on Kyiv and other cities, and Russia is expanding its control over the south. The outcome of the war in Ukraine is anything but certain. And yet, Raphael S. Cohen writes in Lawfare, one thing is clear: “The war in Ukraine will be a watershed historical event.”

He highlights four macro-levels trends which are upending the strategic balance in Europe. Russia will likely emerge weaker but, perhaps, no less dangerous, but Europe will likely become stronger militarily, less energy dependent, and more unified against Russia.

The four macro-level trends Cohen identifies:

1. Russia Will Likely Emerge Weaker but, Perhaps, No Less Dangerous
Even if Russia ekes out some sort of operational win in Ukraine, in the sense of capturing territory or coercing concessions, its victory will almost certainly be a pyrrhic one. But an enfeebled Russia may not equate to a less dangerous one.

Assuming the Putin regime remains in place—not necessarily a given—a cornered, isolated and aggrieved Russia actually may be more likely to lash out violently than a content one.

Russia has bounced back from costly conflicts before—be it after the Russo-Japanese War, the Second World War or the Soviet war in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, compared to prior to the conflict, Russia will likely have an even weaker hand to play.

2. Europe Likely Will Become Militarily Stronger
Despite multiple U.S. leaders cajoling and threatening European states to spend more on defense, European hard power had been on the wane for decades following the end of the Cold War.

Russia’s seizure of Crimea in 2014 prompted Europe to rearm,The intensity and brutality of the current Ukraine conflict will likely further shock Europe to invest more.

3. Europe May Become Less Energy Dependent on Russia
Europe’s reliance on Russian energy—Russia’s other major source of leverage—may be in some ways more difficult and take longer to solve than the military imbalance.Shifting economies away from this dependency will likely be neither cheap nor quick, but Europe has moved in this direction.

Interestingly, the push to move away from Russian energy comes with a pull across Europe toward green energy. Europe’s realization that its dependence on Russian energy poses a vulnerability arguably to both national security and human security concerns could potentially build a more durable political coalition to take the hard and expensive measures necessary for Europe to wean itself from Russian gas.

4. Europe Likely Will Be More Unified—At Least When It Comes to Russia
Before Russia invaded Ukraine, NATO was in the midst of an identity crisis. Russian aggression in Ukraine, however,has laid bare Russia’s continuing threat to the eastern flank of Europe, while demonstrating the importance of continued U.S. involvement in European security. While there are limits to European unity, there is at least a universal consensus that Russia should not be allowed to invade other sovereign states.

Cohen concludes:

A Strategic Advantage for the West?
Collectively, the United States may find itself in a better strategic position than it did at the outset of the conflict, with a more muscular, more unified, more energy-independent Europe that is better able to defend itself against a comparatively weaker Russia. If so, the shift would have global implications. With five named adversaries spread around the world, the U.S. military struggles with a simultaneity problem: how to tackle multiple threats, with a limited budget, all at once. If the Ukraine crisis leaves Europe better able to defend itself from further Russian revanchism, then the United States may have greater flexibility to tackle other challenges elsewhere—most notably in the Indo-Pacific.

Of course, the Ukraine conflict is still in the relatively nascent stages. A lot can change. The counter-Russia alliance could fracture, especially as the war drags on. Europe could still renege on its promises to invest more in defense as other priorities crowd out national security. Europe could decide that it is simply too expensive and inflicts too much of an economic burden to shift away from Russian energy, like it has in the past. And even if this strategic picture is true in the long run, this doesn’t do anything to roll back the Russian invasion or alleviate the ongoing suffering of the Ukrainian people.

Still, if these trends hold, the invasion of Ukraine would have continental and global implications. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky often casts the conflict as a “war against Europe” and a war “for all the world.” In more than one sense, he may be right.