Tightening Oversight of “Gain of Function” Research | Bioshield: Twenty Years of Preparedness | The Wrong Way to Fight Anti-Semitism on Campus, and more

Twenty Years of Preparedness  (Adey Pierce-Watkins and Tanima Sinha. BDO)
This July 2, 2024, marks the 20th anniversary of The Project BioShield Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-276); legislation enacted in response to the anthrax attacks of September 2001, which revealed the need for development and acquisition of medical countermeasures (vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics) to protect the U.S. population from chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats. This Act, and associated Congressional Appropriations, established a Special Reserve Fund (SRF) of $5.593B advanced funding available over a 10-year period for the advanced development and procurement of medical countermeasures with the intent of initiating a new posture of national preparedness.1 Simultaneously, this legislation created new market incentives for pharmaceutical and biotech companies to engage in the development of CBRN medical countermeasures and transformed the partnership between the federal government and industry into a shared responsibility for increasing preparedness against CBRN threats. As a result, this legislation and the SRF created a “guaranteed market” for pharmaceutical companies to produce CBRN medical countermeasures for which there previously was no commercial demand…In recognition of the 20th Anniversary of The Project BioShield Act, it is fitting to highlight the impact and milestones of this legislation based on its intended purpose and outcomes to date.

It Should Not Be Easy to Buy Synthetic DNA Fragments to Recreate the 1918 Flu Virus  (Kevin M. Esvelt, Stat)
It should be hard — exceedingly hard — to obtain the synthetic DNA needed to recreate the virus that caused the deadly 1918 influenza pandemic without authorization. But my lab found that it’s surprisingly easy, even when ordering gene fragments from companies that check customers’ orders to detect hazardous sequences.
Our experiment demonstrates that the immense potential benefits of biotechnology are profoundly vulnerable to misuse. A pandemic caused by a virus made from synthetic DNA — or even a lesser instance of synthetic bioterrorism — would not only generate a public health crisis but also trigger crippling restrictions on research.
Both the genome sequences of pandemic viruses and step-by-step protocols to make infectious samples from synthetic DNA are now freely available online. That makes it essential to ensure that all synthetic DNA orders are screened to determine whether they contain hazardous sequences, which should be shipped only to legitimate researchers whose work has been approved by a biosafety authority.
Gene synthesis leaders are aware of the security risks and the potential for liability: sequence providers who belong to the International Gene Synthesis Consortium (IGSC) have been voluntarily screening orders since 2009. But these efforts aren’t very useful if most of the dozens of non-members don’t screen their orders, if IGSC firms will ship fragments of hazardous sequences without proof of biosafety approval, or if sequence screening can be easily bypassed.

The Wrong Way to Fight Anti-Semitism on Campus  (Conor Friedersdorf, The Atlantic)
The House of Representatives passed the Antisemitism Awareness Act last week in a bipartisan vote of 320 to 91. “Antisemitism is on the rise,” it declares, and is “impacting Jewish students.”
Bigotry against Jews is vile and warrants the nation’s attention. As President Joe Biden said Tuesday at the Holocaust Memorial Museum, “This hatred continues to lie deep in the hearts of too many people in the world and requires our continued vigilance.” But the Antisemitism Awareness Act is the wrong way to fight those ills. If passed by the Senate and signed into law, it would codify a controversial definition of anti-Semitism (among its 11 specific examples of anti-Semitic rhetoric: “The existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor”). And it would direct the Department of Education to consider that definition when judging complaints against colleges under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which says that no person, on the grounds of race, color, or national origin, can be “excluded from participation” in a program, denied its benefits, or “be subjected to discrimination.”
Interpreting Title VI has always been difficult and contested, particularly when speech that is protected by the First Amendment is alleged to be discriminatory as well. The act should be rejected by the Senate. Its definition of anti-Semitism is too expansive to serve as a unifying standard in academia, and it doubles down on an approach to antidiscrimination that chills free speech while failing to reduce hate.