Defending American Interests Abroad

·  Future research could include more non-English sources because much of the harmful information activity targeting foreign audiences is conducted in languages other than English, as malign actors seek to exploit other nations for their own strategic objectives.

Here is the report’s Introduction:

Malign information operations by foreign actors seek to undermine the strategic interests of the United States.1 These operations, which are often orchestrated by authoritarian regimes, are intended to manipulate the global information environment for geostrategic purposes.2 Such operations seek to shape public perceptions abroad by “creat[ing] propaganda to undermine other nations’ national security.”3 The advent of advanced technologies and the popularity of digital media platforms have increased the potential scale of these operations by allowing malign entities to generate and distribute misinformation with increased efficiency and reach.4

In addition to spreading false or misleading information, malign information operations often employ broader forms of propaganda to shape narratives, shift public discourse, and undermine other nations’ national security.5 These operations often leverage classical propaganda techniques, such as

·  name-calling, which attaches disparaging labels to opponents

·  glittering generalities, which use vague, positive phrases to garner approval

·  transfer, which links the authority or prestige of something else to what is being promoted

·  testimonial, which uses endorsements from celebrities or authorities to imply credibility

• plain-folk, which appeals to the average person’s values and experiences

·  card-stacking, which selectively presents information favorable to one perspective

·  bandwagon, which promotes the idea that because everyone else is doing it, one should too.6 These techniques can be used to manipulate emotions, reinforce existing biases, and sway public opinions abroad.

We use the 1939 work The Fine Art of Propaganda as our primary source for a definition of propaganda because of its historical significance and general alignment with the U.S. Army field manual on psychological operations.7 The framework for identifying propaganda techniques that this source provides is both specific and practical. The seven devices represent a balance between simplicity and breadth, making the system useful for operational applications.8 The devices identified in The Fine Art of Propaganda were a response to real-world concerns raised during the escalation of international political conflict in the 1930s, and this work has shaped contemporary approaches to media literacy and critical analysis by providing a framework to identify propaganda in media messages.9

Both Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have been particularly adept at employing information warfare to achieve their geostrategic objectives. Russia’s “information operations . . . are particularly acute.”10 Its concept of maskirovka, or military deception, exemplifies its whole-of government approach to shaping international perceptions.11 This approach includes false flag operations, the use of proxies, and coordinated disinformation campaigns to shape perceptions and influence public opinion and narratives at home and abroad.12 Such activities are characteristic of gray zone competition, in which states pursue strategic objectives while operating below the threshold of armed conflict. The PRC’s approach, although different, shows significant learning from Russia’s tactics. The PRC’s propaganda efforts, such as the concept of waixuan (or external propaganda), aim to overcome what the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) views as a “discourse deficit” by flooding the global information space with pro-PRC narratives, countering negative perceptions, and presenting an alternative viewpoint to global audiences.13 Both countries employ these strategies to shift international opinion and undermine U.S. interests.

Even though the PRC and Russia are commonly cited threats,14 the risks from foreign malign information operations are not limited to these two countries. Both state and nonstate actors, including Iran and such violent extremist organizations as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), have adopted similar tactics of exploiting vulnerabilities in the information environment to influence public perception abroad and promote their own political aims.15 Iran actively spreads narratives through its state-controlled media to counter international sanctions and bolster its image by highlighting the regime’s supposed economic and technological advancements.16 Similarly, such state actors as the Taliban use their own news media to promote stories that overstate their governance efforts by exaggerating infrastructure projects and social services in an attempt to present themselves as political actors deserving of domestic and international legitimacy.17

Notes

1 Senate Armed Services Committee, “Advance Policy Questions for Peter ‘Pete’ B. Hegseth Nominee to Serve as Secretary of Defense.”

2 CNA Communications Team, “How China and Russia Use Information Operations to Compete with the US.”

3 The White House [@WhiteHouse], “@VP JD Vance speaks at the AI Summit in Paris: ‘Hostile foreign adversaries have weaponized AI software to rewrite history, surveil users, and censor speech . . . I want to be clear—this Administration will block such efforts, full stop.’”

4 Hanson, Grissom, and Mouton, The Future of Indo-Pacific Information Warfare.

5 Allen [@Gregory_C_Allen], “Here’s a 99% transcript of the Vice President JD Vance Speech at the AI Action Summit . . .”

6 Lee and Lee, eds., The Fine Art of Propaganda.

7 Department of the Army, Psychological Operations.

8 For example, we considered a much longer list of 18 devices but opted for a more parsimonious framework. See Da San Martino et al., “Prta: A System to Support the Analysis of Propaganda Techniques in the News.”

9 Freelon and Wells, “Disinformation as Political Communication.”

10 Senate Armed Services Committee, “Advance Policy Questions for Peter ‘Pete’ B. Hegseth Nominee to Serve as Secretary of Defense.”

11 Chin, “Maskirovka in the Information Age.”

12 Chin et al., “When Dragons Watch Bears.”

13 Chen, “China Learning From Russia’s ‘Emerging Great Power’ Global Media Tactics.”

14 Senate Armed Services Committee, “Advance Policy Questions for Peter ‘Pete’ B. Hegseth Nominee to Serve as Secretary of Defense.”

15 Greene and Lucas, “Once More, with Feeling.”

16 Tabatabai, Iran’s Authoritarian Playbook.

17 Lucas, “Mere Puffery or Convincing Claims?”

Christopher A. Mouton is Senior Engineer; Professor, RAND School of Public Policy. Caleb Lucas is an assistant professor of international relations and statistical methodology at Indiana University Bloomington. Before joining IU, Lucas was a political scientist in the National Security Research Division at the RAND Corporation. Shaun Ee is Strategy Manager / Researcher, Policy and Standards, Institute for AI Policy and Strategy (IAPS). This article is published courtesy of RAND.