Defending U.S. Military Bases Against Drones? A Recent Tabletop Exercise Explores How
The scenarios followed an “action,” “reaction,” and “counteraction” phasing, wherein the drone incursion encouraged participants’ response that further shaped crisis escalation. This approach provided for a dynamic, flexible, and responsive simulation. While the sample of participants was broadly cross-sectional, reflecting relevant stakeholders across the Joint Force and Interagency, it was not fully representative of the federal government, military services, and local law enforcement. Rather, it is what political scientists call a convenience sample.
Participants volunteered to attend the tabletop exercise, potentially introducing selection bias. Thus, we are unable to draw broad generalizations about the way officials understand the use of counter-drone operations in the homeland. Yet the sample of participants was comprised of informed and knowledgeable stakeholders from the community of interest. This implies that we are afforded rare insights into how decisionmakers think about mitigating drone incursions in the homeland. To further manage bias, the tabletop exercise used free play. Experts from JCO and RAND managed participants’ discussions to inform their decisions about triggers, domain awareness, and escalation, and captured feedback using questionnaires, move sheets, and rapporteurs.
The tabletop exercise resulted in three key findings. Together, these outcomes could allow Northern Command to adopt a proactive approach to defend military bases against drone incursions.
First, the event informed Northern Command’s operational approach to mitigate drone incursions at military bases. Specifically, the tabletop exercise refined the triggers for Northern Command’s response escalation as well as capabilities. Participants’ discussions suggest that Northern Command, as well as forces assigned to military bases, must balance citizens’ right to fly drones, assuming they do so legally, with drones’ perceived threat to national security.
Aside from the inherent right to self-defense, the tabletop exercise identified three instances where Northern Command could exercise a leadership role in synchronizing homeland defense against drone incursions at military bases. These include drone incursions that overwhelm the organic defensive capabilities of the services; are simultaneously conducted at different military bases, especially those performing essential missions; and, undermine public trust in the military and government, which is a political consideration informed by elected officials’ understanding of their constituencies.
The exercise also endorsed Northern Command’s development of “fly-away” kits to enhance homeland defense against drone incursions at military bases, assuming certain triggers are met. Fly-away kits are “rapidly deployable, prepackaged counter-drone technology, along with personnel trained to employ that technology, that can be dispatched via commercial aircraft to get to the installation in need.” Crucially, fly-away kits are not a silver bullet against drone incursions at military bases. Rather, they are additive to existing capabilities and designed to enhance layered defense, thus reflecting hard-fought lessons from counter-drone operations conducted abroad.
A layered defense approach calibrates nonlethal and lethal effects against drones based on their bearing, altitude, and range from military bases, and is largely applicable in the homeland. The first layer maximizes the distance between drones and military bases and consists of nonlethal capabilities, such as electronic warfare. The second layer incorporates the use of microwave weapons as well as high-energy lasers to achieve a “soft kill” of drones, given their updated bearing, lower altitude, and shorter range from installations. The final layer integrates direct-fire weapons, such as machine guns and small missiles, to achieve a “hard kill” of drones. Though political and military leaders often shudder at the possibility of using lethal capabilities to interdict drone incursions in the homeland, especially given the potential for collateral damage, research shows (PDF) that Americans support doing so, especially at military bases.
Second, the tabletop exercise emphasized the need for a framework to integrate, enable, and synchronize state, local, tribal, and territorial authorities into counter-drone operations at or near military bases. Usually, these authorities are the first to identify drone incursions, as well as receive reports of these incidents from concerned citizens. These authorities also respond first to unlawful drone operations, most of which take place outside of military bases. Lastly, these authorities are often necessary for determining point of origin and where drones go after an incursion. Cooperation with the National Guard provides a mechanism for Northern Command to cultivate better situational awareness, capability development, data sharing, and interoperability across federal, state, and local law enforcement for counter-drone operations in the homeland.
The National Guard is represented in every state and territory. Importantly, Adjutant Generals, who manage National Guard units across America, have access to Civil Support Teams (PDF). As opposed to Homeland Response Teams (PDF), which are regionally aligned, Civil Support Teams are assigned to each adjutant general, meaning they are highly responsive. These teams consist of 21 personnel, are deployable within 90 minutes of notification, and are available 24 hours, seven days a week, and for the entire year. Arguably, Civil Support Teams also perform a less pressing mission—support to civil authorities during a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear explosion. Further, these teams have large budgets that can offset the equipping and training costs for counter-drone operations. Outfitted with a standardized kit for counter-drone operations, and given the requisite training, Civil Support Teams could allow Northern Command to coordinate, integrate, and synchronize state, local, tribal, and territorial authorities to interdict problematic drone incursions at military bases.
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“Americans generally support counter-drone operations in the homeland but that their attitudes are shaped by several considerations.”
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Finally, the tabletop exercise also clarified conditions that would justify the Federal Aviation Administration’s support to the use of counterpositioning, navigation, and timing capabilities to jam unlawful drones at or near military bases. Research shows that Americans generally support counter-drone operations in the homeland but that their attitudes are shaped (PDF) by several considerations. First, Americans approve counter-drone operations when drone incursions threaten national security, particularly when they happen at military bases and involve foreign adversaries. Second, Americans’ support for counter-drone operations increases when they are endorsed by senior officials, especially the president. Third, though Americans prioritize national security, they are sensitive to collateral damage, and personal safety is inversely related to public support for counter-drone operations.
Despite these findings, the Federal Aviation Administration has been reticent about supporting the use of high-end jamming capabilities to defeat drone incursions in the homeland except in response to the most dangerous incursions. Northern Command should encourage counter-drone operations at military bases that do not initially incorporate high-end jamming capabilities and then work the risk-based calculations necessary to determine how they fit into a smooth, escalatory ladder that may be necessary for mitigation.
These insights may inform Northern Command’s approach to homeland defense against drone incursions at military bases. They also suggest ways to support Northern Command in proactively defending military bases against drone incursions.
Paul Lushenko is the chief strategist and director of Future Studies and Wargaming for the Joint Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office. He is the coauthor of The Legitimacy of Drone Warfare: Evaluating Public Perceptions (2024). BG Russell McGuire is the assistant adjunct general for the Virginia National Guard and vice director of Operations for Cyber for the National Guard Bureau. Christopher Pernin is a senior physical scientist and director of the Engineering and Applied Sciences Department at RAND. Sean Zeigler is a senior political scientist at RAND. This article is published courtesy of RAND.
