ARGUMENT: ACHIEVING DRONE DOMINANCEFactories First: Winning the Drone War Before It Starts
Wars are won by factories before they are won on the battlefield,Martin C. Feldmann writes, noting that the United States lacks the manufacturing depth for the coming drone age. Rectifying this situation “will take far more than procurement tweaks,” Feldmann writes. “It demands a national-level, wartime-scale industrial mobilization.”
Wars are won by factories before they are won on the battlefield,Martin C. Feldmann writes in War on the Rocks. He notes that Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, recognizing that the United States lacks the manufacturing depth for the coming drone age, issued his “Unleashing U.S. Military Drone Dominance” memo, pledging to “bolster the nascent U.S. drone manufacturing base” and delegating buying power to frontline units.
“That promise, however, will take far more than procurement tweaks and approving ‘hundreds of American products for purchase,’” Feldmann writes. “It demands a national-level, wartime-scale industrial mobilization.”
Beijing shows why. Chinese civilian manufacturers have the capacity to retool in under a year to turn out one billion weaponized drones annually — without slowing the rest of China’s economy. By our calculations, that would require less than 1 percent of its assembly capacity, less than 5 percent of its battery output, and a fraction of its printed-circuit-board capacity. If the United States is to deter a capability of that magnitude, industrial policy should focus on enabling the mass production of autonomous systems. Part of the effort should be the establishment of new enterprises and the development of new capabilities. At least as important, however, will be the efficient utilization of the existing national industrial base.
Feldmann goes on the describe U.S. capabilities in plastics, motors, batteries, printed circuits, cameras, and assembly, then writes:
To win at scale and unlock enduring economic gains, the United States should pair sheer production capacity with software-driven technological flexibility. A modular code stack turns swarms of small autonomous systems into “hardware-enabled, software-defined”platforms whose function changes with a simple firmware update. One week it’s a loitering munition, the next a crop-sprayer, warehouse picker, or oil rig inspector. The same low-cost microcontrollers and AI libraries that animate aerial drones can also drive factory robots, subsea monitors, and medical assistants. Opening this architecture to both public and private sector developers will spur real-time solutions across industries worth hundreds of billions of dollars and generating more growth and tax revenue on top of the initial defense investment.
Stack all these numbers atop one another, and the picture clarifies. It is possible to hit a million-drone per year pilot line in 12 months, scale to ten million in year three, and if there is a commitment to parallel capacity builds, reach 100 million units by year five. That trajectory does not close the entire gap with China, but it gives Washington a credible deterrent and a bridge to the billion-drone annual target the moment Congress decides the stakes warrant it.
Feldmann concludes:
Industrial policy in the United States works best when it focuses on demand signals, not central planning. The Pentagon memo frames drone supremacy as “a process race as much as a technological race,” aligning perfectly with this call for demand-signal government programming. The Franklin D. Roosevelt administration did not design the B-24 Liberator — it guaranteed Ford that if Willow Run built one an hour, the government would buy every last bomber. The same clarity is needed today.
A drone swarm factory is not sunk cost — it is a moonshot that would lead to commercial robotics boom in agriculture, logistics, infrastructure and much more. Every dollar the United States spends signals a future dual-use market. Just as NASA’s Apollo guidance computers seeded Silicon Valley, a drone swarm program of record would do the same for next-generation power electronics, battery chemistries, advanced plastics, and AI-enabled edge devices.
In his memo, Hegseth stated: “Emergent technologies require new funding lines. To address the urgent need for drones, investment methods outlined in Executive Order 14307 are being investigated.” In line with this, Congress should authorize a five-year, $25–$30 billion procurement — about what the Navy spent on just three Zumwalt-class destroyers — to buy Group 1 drones and their subcomponents at pre-agreed price caps. The Defense Department’s message to industry should be unequivocal: Stand up the line and we will clear the loading dock.
They should also incentivize performers to partner with Tier 1 and Tier 2 auto suppliers for frame molding, precision metal parts, camera modules, and sensors. These firms already understand Six Sigma quality at million-unit volumes — what they lack is a reason to pivot. Guaranteed drone orders supply that reason. Once domestic output clears 100 million units, the United States should allocate export packages to European and Indo-Pacific allies willing to mirror our manufacturing lines and processes. Distributed production complicates enemy targeting and reinforces collective deterrence.
